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Since the start of the 21
st
 century, energy security concerns and rising 
international energy costs have led China to pursue the development of a coal to oil 
industry, whereby converting a portion of the nation’s abundant coal reserves into 
gasoline, diesel, or jet fuel, China might be able to increase its domestic 'oil' 
production and generate profits. But a large-scale coal to oil industry exerts added 
pressure on China’s domestic coal reserves and water resources, and generates significant 
greenhouse gas emissions. The tension between the potential benefits of coal to oil 
development and its associated negative externalities present a challenge for China’s 
energy policymakers, who must balance competing demands for energy security, 
resource management, and equitable development. The challenge of effectively managing 
the development of this industry is complicated by the characteristic problems plaguing 
energy sector governance in China, including the absence of a powerful energy 
policymaking institution, the decentralized nature of the country’s economic development, 
and the influence of large energy companies.  
This study examines the evolution of China’s coal to oil industry and the policies 
shaping its development in order to better understand energy sector governance in China 
and the complex challenges confronting policymakers as they strive to balance an array 
of competing demands. It finds that weak energy institutions and powerful domestic 
actors indeed hinder China’s ability to efficiently formulate energy policies for the coal to 
oil industry, while considerations about the industry’s environmental and resource 
impacts compel a cautious approach to development. China’s incremental approach to 
formulating a long-term plan for the development of the coal to oil industry may, in the 













I never imagined when I started my graduate studies at Portland State University 
(PSU) in the fall of 2005 that it would take almost five years to complete a Master of Arts 
in Geography. But after two years of coursework, two years of intensive language study 
in China, and nine months of thesis writing, I am only now, in the summer of 2010, 
graduating. Nonetheless, I would not change anything about how my graduate education 
has unfolded, nor would I condense the past five years even if I could. Rather, I am 
extraordinarily thankful for the opportunities I have had since starting at PSU and have 
learned more than I ever hoped or planned when I began this degree. During this time I 
have benefited greatly from the support of many people. 
 I would like to thank Martha Works and Geoffrey Duh for contributing their time 
and expertise as members of my thesis committee, and Karin Waller for her continued 
support as I communicated with the department from afar the past three years. I am 
indebted to Jonathan Pease and Steve Wadley for introducing me to the Chinese language 
and for supporting me as I pursued both scholarships and opportunities to study advanced 
Chinese overseas. I would also like to thank Hiro Ito of the Economics Department for 
helping me to understand the economic foundations of East Asia’s rapid development, 
and for being a friend and informal advisor.  
I am grateful for the financial support I received from the Department of 
Geography’s Dale and Coral Courtney Scholarship, Rockie Scholarship, and Price 
Fieldwork Award; from the D. Paul Fansler Memorial Scholarship; and from the David L. 
Boren National Security Education Program.  
It is impossible for me to properly thank or express my appreciation for the two 
mentors who played such an important role in making my education at PSU a wonderful 
experience, both personally and professionally. Mel Gurtov has been a source of 
inspiration - for his principles, his sense of humor, and his humanity. He will forever be a 
role model that I strive to emulate. I am especially grateful and indebted to my primary 
advisor, Gil Latz, who accepted me as an advisee midway through my first year at PSU 
and who has since devoted countless hours to his role as mentor. His professionalism and 
thoughtfulness have made it a joy and honor to be his student, and I will benefit 
throughout my career from his example. It has been my privilege to study under Mel and 
Gil. It is an even greater privilege to consider them my friends. 
Above all, I am grateful to my parents for their continued love and support. I 
would not be who I am or where I am without their guidance, and their belief in me has 
been an endless source of encouragement and assurance. Having them as parents is the 











List of Tables……………………………………………….……………………………..v 
List of Figures…………………………………………...………………………………..vi 
List of Abbreviations……………………………………………………………………vii 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction.......................................................................................................1  
 
1.1 Overview of Thesis…………………………….................................……….……1 
1.2 Contribution……………….………………………………………………….......8 
1.3 Research Methodology…………………………………………………………..10 
1.4 Research Barriers………………………………………………………………..11 
1.5 Thesis Committee Composition………………………………….………………14 
Chapter 2: China‘s Energy Resource Endowment, Energy Security Policies, and Role  
   of Coal Liquids……………………………………………………………....15 
 
2.1  Introduction……………………………………………….……………………...15 
2.2 China‘s Energy Resource Endowment…………………………………………..15 
2.3 China‘s Energy Security Dilemma………………………….......…………….....19 
2.4 The Meaning of Energy Security in China………………………………………22 
2.5  China‘s Response to its Energy Security Dilemma and the Role of Alternative 
Fuels.......................................................................................................................26 
2.6  Defining Coal to Oil and Imposing Limitations on the Scope of This Study……27 
2.7  History of Coal to Oil………………………………………………………...….31 
2.8  Coal to Oil Processes: Direct and Indirect……………………………….........…32 
2.9 Coal to Oil Resource Impacts and Economics…………………………………...33 
 2.9.1  Coal Consumption……………………………………………………….33 
 2.9.2 Water Consumption……………………………………………………...34 
 2.9.3  Greenhouse Gas Emissions……………………………………………....35 
 2.9.4  Economics ……………………………………………………………….36 
2.10  Geographical Prerequisites for Building a Coal to Oil Plant………………….…38 
2.11  Why CTL is an Attractive Strategy for China…………………………………...40 
 
Chapter 3: Energy Policymaking in China: Three Core Challenges.................................42 
3.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………….....…42 
3.2 Fragmented and Weak Bureaucracies…………………………………………..……43 
3.3 Powerful Energy Companies………………………………………………………...46 




Chapter 4: The Evolution of China‘s Coal to Oil Industry................................................51 
 
4.1 Introduction ………………………………………………………………………….51 
4.2 Early History of Coal to Oil Development in China………………………………....51 
4.2 The Evolution of China‘s Coal to Oil Industry and Policies………………………...54 
4.3 China’s Coal to Oil Industry Today………………………………………………….67 
4.3 Summary………………………….…………...……………………………………..72 
 
Chapter 5: Analysis – Focus on Resource and Environmental Issues…………………...75 
 
5.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………..75 
5.2 Yellow River Water Challenges………………………………..……………………77 
5.3 Managing Greenhouse Gas Emissions…………………….…………………………81 
5.4 The Challenge of Sustainably Managing China’s Coal Resources……….…………83 
5.5 Assessing the Central Government‘s Efforts to Address the Environmental and         
Resource Challenges Associated with Coal to Oil Development................................86 
5.6 Efforts to Mitigate Water Resource Impacts from Coal to Oil……………............…86 
5.7 Efforts to Address Coal to Oil Greenhouse Gas Emissions……………..........…...…90 
5.8 Recognition of Coal to Oil‘s Demand Pressures on Coal Reserves…………............92 
5.9 Central Government Recognition of the Challenges Posed by Coal to Oil‘s Resource  
    Demands......................................................................................................................93 
 
Chapter 6: Key Findings and Implications........................................................................95 
 
6.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………………..…95 
6.2 The Challenge of Decentralization…………………………………………………..98 
6.3 Influential Energy Companies……………………………………………………100 
6.4 China‘s Energy Policymaking Process……………………………………………..107 
6.5 Conclusions..................................................................... .............................112 
6.6 The Future of Coal to Oil in China…………………………………………….…114 
6.7 Implications of Coal to Oil in China and Beyond…………………….....……….…115 












List of Tables 






















List of Figures 
 
Figure 1. Energy Content of China‘s Fossil Fuel Reserve Base, 2007…………......…..17 
Figure 2. China‘s Energy Supply by Fuel, 2005……………………………….......…….18 
Figure 3. China‘s Oil Balance in the IEA 2007 World Energy Outlook Reference  
   Scenario……………………………………………………........…..................21 
Figure 4. Comparing the Greenhouse Gas Emissions of Different Fuels……………..…36 
Figure 5. Approximate Location of Ordos, Inner Mongolia and Pingdingshan, Henan....53 
Figure 6. Approximate Location of the Ningdong Coal Chemical Base, Ningxia and  
        Yulin, Shaanxi……………………………………………........................……56 
Figure 7. Approximate Location of China‘s Largest Substitute Fossil-Fuel Production 
        Base………………………………………………………....………………....61 
Figure 8. Approximate Representation of Yellow River basin and the Location of  
  China‘s Five Flagship Coal to Oil Projects……………………….…………...74 
Figure 9. Primary Energy Demand – People‘s Republic of China………………………83 
Figure 10. Coal Production in China – Scenario Based on Present Reserve  

















List of Abbreviations 
 
bpd  Barrels per day 
CCP  Chinese Communist Party 
EIA  Energy Information Administration (United States Department of Energy) 
mta  Million tons per annum   
MTOE  Million tons of oil equivalent 
NDRC  National Development and Reform Commission 
NEA   National Energy Administration 














Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview of Thesis 
China‘s remarkable economic growth over the past thirty years has led to 
dramatic increases in energy demand, threatening China‘s ability to maintain adequate 
access to energy supplies. This trend has been the focus of much attention and concern 
both inside and outside of China over the past ten years. Concerns center on the strains 
China‘s growing energy demand is placing on world energy supplies; the environmental 
impact of China‘s energy consumption, particularly in relation to global climate change; 
and the geopolitical implications of China‘s emergence as a new player in the world‘s 
energy security calculus. These concerns have led to a renewed interest in the policies 
governing China‘s sector and how they attempt to take into account not only the issue of 
energy security, but also the needs to maintain stable macro-economic growth, improve 
environmental sustainability, and promote equitable development. These issues overlap 
with core interests of the central government and Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 
including the Party‘s ability to stay in power, maintain social stability, and sustain 
China‘s trajectory toward great power status. In short, effective energy policies that 
balance competing domestic demands with the need for energy security are essential 
both to China‘s continued rise and the survival of the CCP.  
Energy resource distribution in China both constrains and informs decisions 
about energy policy. Many of the energy challenges facing leaders in Beijing are the 
direct result of China‘s distinct natural resource endowment, and Chinese policymakers 
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must contend with geographical realities as they determine how to meet national energy 
needs. Geographical issues confronting policy makers include the unequal distribution of 
China‘s energy resources endowment, including coal, oil, and natural gas; the distance 
between production bases and consumption areas; competing demands for scarce or 
finite resources in energy production areas; and balancing China‘s national-level energy 
resource demands with the needs of local populations and environmental concerns. 
Under ideal circumstances, market mechanisms determine how these issues are 
overcome or accounted for, and when market mechanisms cannot balance competing 
priorities, the political process creates rational and coherent solutions that effectively 
relate natural resources to national objectives. But China‘s energy sector (like that of 
other countries) does not function under ideal conditions, and the management of energy 
resources and the making of energy policy are shaped by a number of inputs, factors and 
constraints, both domestic and external (Meidan, 2007, 36). The distribution of resources 
in China creates some of China‘s energy challenges and shapes decisions about how to 
address them, but it is only one factor among many that influences energy policy.  
 The common perception of China‘s approach to managing its energy endowment 
is generally assumed to be as follows: the central government is firmly in control of 
energy policy, the term ―state owned‖ equates to ―state controlled,‖ and an authoritarian, 
top-down vertical Chinese state structure creates strategic purpose and coherence in the 
energy policy making arena (Cunningham, 2007). This perception fits the rational 
decision-making model where ―decisions would be made by a group of individuals with 
a common set of values through the rational analysis of a problem and the evaluation of 
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alternative solutions‖ (Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1988). However, this perception does 
not match reality. According to those who have studied closely China‘s energy policy-
making process, China‘s energy policies and energy institutions are fragmented, 
ineffective, decentralized, ad hoc, reactive, and subject to the interests of powerful 
domestic actors and stakeholders (Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1988; Andrews-Speed, 
2004). Most importantly, it is simplistic to reflexively attribute every development in 
China‘s energy sector, at home or abroad, to highly coordinated strategic planning 
originating from the center. 
To better understand how energy policy is made and executed in China, and the 
different factors that inform the process, scholars have carried out numerous case-studies 
on China‘s energy institutions, the energy policy making process, and specific aspects of 
China‘s energy sector. In the aggregate, these studies reveal energy institutions that are 
unable to formulate and implement a coherent national energy policy, fierce competition 
between competing interests and stakeholders, and a central government struggling to 
govern and control events on the ground.  
Of the many different inputs to the system that must be accounted for in the study 
of Chinese energy policy making, the composition and distribution of China‘s energy 
and natural resources is one the most important as it sets the parameters of the debate 
and limits policy options. A government can choose how to allocate or exploit energy 
resources, but it cannot create resources where there are none. At the same time, how 
and where energy resources are exploited often directly impacts other natural resources 
and the local environment. China‘s energy policies, then, attempt to balance the 
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opportunities and constraints posed by energy resource endowments, domestic economic 
and social issues, and the conditions of the larger international geopolitical environment. 
The reverse is true as well; decisions about how to develop and exploit China‘s energy 
resources invariably affect other social, economic, resource, and geopolitical issues. 
One emerging industry that has not been studied in depth but can provide 
important insights into Chinese energy policies and the competing energy and resource 
challenges confronting policymakers is China‘s nascent coal-to-oil industry (hereafter 
referred to as coal to oil), the process of converting coal into gasoline and diesel. Coal to 
oil, for reasons that will be explained further in the chapters that follow, is often thought 
of as an energy security strategy whereby converting coal into synthetic oil products a 
country can reduce its reliance on oil imports and enhance the reliability and 
predictability of its oil supplies. Coal to oil projects in China are often framed in this 
context, but the industry also brings into play many of the key dynamics thought to 
influence the processes and outcomes of de facto and national-level energy policy 
making in China, including the distribution of energy resources, and is of potentially 
great significance to China‘s energy security, sustainable development, and social 
stability.  
Despite the political and environmental salience of this industry, and the 
spasmodic nature of its early development, a comprehensive survey of the industry‘s 
relatively short history, the geographic and resource issues shaping its development, and 
means by which the central government has managed its development has yet to be 
conducted. This study will attempt to fill that void, and will seek to address three key 
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questions. First, do the energy policies governing the development of the coal to oil 
industry in China reflect awareness on the part of the central government of the 
potentially negative environmental and resource impacts of coal to oil development in 
China? Second, how has the government attempted to balance resource and 
environmental constraints with the potential benefits of coal to oil? Third, what does the 
government‘s management of this industry reveal about energy sector governance in 
general? To answer these questions, this study will analyze the evolution of the coal to 
oil industry and the policies guiding its development between 2000 and 2010, and will 
explore how these policies account for (or do not account for) three of the key resource 
and environmental concerns that this industry will affect: water resources, coal resources, 
and greenhouse gas emissions. In answering these core questions, several additional 
topics will be explored in depth. First, how does China‘s energy resource endowment 
affect China‘s energy security outlook? Second, what is coal to oil and why is it part of 
China‘s strategy for improving energy security? And finally, how effectively is the 
government balancing the competing demands of energy security and sustainable 
development in relation to the coal to oil industry, and what are the other factors that are 
influencing how this process unfolds?  
This study has six chapters. Following the introduction, chapter two provides 
background on how China‘s distinct natural resource endowment shapes the country‘s 
energy security outlook and the concomitant problem of energy insecurity, and why coal 
to oil is being considered as part of China‘s strategy for improving its energy security. 
China‘s primary source of energy insecurity is its growing reliance on imported oil, and 
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China‘s relatively small oil reserves limit the government‘s ability to increase domestic 
oil production to offset growth in demand. These observations serve as background to 
why abundant coal reserves may provide an alternative path for increasing domestic 
liquid fuel production through the process known as coal to oil. After surveying China‘s 
energy security and resource landscape, the second half of the chapter introduces the 
coal to oil process, discusses the reemergence of this industry as a result of global energy 
supply and demand trends, and explains why coal to oil is an attractive strategy in the 
context of China‘s domestic energy reserves and the international geopolitical 
environment. The chapter will close with an outline of the demands this industry places 
on coal resources, water resources, and the environment. 
In chapter three, I review the literature on China‘s energy policymaking process 
and outline the main conclusions of previous studies and research in this field. The goal 
of this section is to shed light on factors other than China‘s resource endowment and 
energy security concerns that directly and indirectly shape energy policy and resource 
management. These factors include powerful state-owned energy companies, 
government institutions and bureaucracies, and relations between the central government 
and the provinces. Understanding the challenges and forces confronting Chinese 
policymakers and energy institutions requires dissecting a complex set of issues, 
including those associated with China‘s unique energy geography. This chapter lays the 
groundwork for later analysis of how the coal to oil industry has been managed. 
In chapter four, I describe the evolution and present state of the coal to oil 
industry in China. To do so I provide background on the early history of China‘s coal to 
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oil program and describe in detail how the industry has grown over the past ten years. I 
will focus specifically on the years between 2004 and the present (mid-year, 2010) and 
will use news reports, journal articles, and government and industry announcements to 
create a timeline that outlines the major projects, the specifics of their development, and 
the policies and directives used to shape the industry‘s evolution. In addition to 
describing key events and projects, I examine the arguments made by actors within 
China for why coal to oil should or should not develop, the dynamics surrounding the 
industry, and the attitudes of the stakeholders involved. At the conclusion of the chapter 
I will describe the present status of the industry as of mid-year, 2010. 
In chapter five, I provide background on three of the major resource and 
environmental issues this industry will affect, which are coal resources, water resources, 
and greenhouse gas emissions. In this section I provide background on the water 
challenges facing the Yellow River basin, the location of China‘s coal to oil project 
development; the associated risks climate change poses to China and how China is 
addressing its greenhouse gas emissions problem; and the makeup and outlook of 
China‘s coal resources. Next, I discuss how coal to oil development will affect each of 
these issues. Finally, I explore how the government has or has not attempted to account 
for the impact of coal to oil in each of these three areas. The purpose of this section will 
be to identify the key resource and environmental issues in play and to determine 
whether or not the central government is aware of and responding to the challenges 
posed by coal to oil development.  
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In the sixth and final chapter, I explain my observations and findings on energy 
policymaking in the coal to oil industry and compare those observations with the 
literature on China‘s energy policy and policymaking. I also combine analysis of the 
situation with my own interpretation of how to understand the government‘s predicament, 
why it has responded the way it has, and whether or not that response has been successful 
or logical. Finally, I discuss the implications of coal to oil development for China and the 
world, provide my own view on the matter, and offer some closing thoughts. 
 
1.2 Contribution  
How China‘s energy sector develops over the coming two decades (2010-2030) will 
play a significant role in determining whether or not the planet is able to avert the worst 
consequences of global climate change. China has already surpassed the United States in 
total greenhouse gas emissions and by 2040 China will be the largest cumulative 
historical emitter of carbon in spite of its relatively late start (Lieberthal, 2009). China is 
already making great strides in developing clean sources of energy, improving energy 
efficiency, and reducing carbon intensity, strides that are the result of specific energy 
policies originating in Beijing. Nonetheless, China (like the United States) has a long 
road ahead if it is going to reduce emissions to sustainable levels. How China manages 
its energy resources and formulates its energy policies will play a vital role in this 
process.  
This research is the first in-depth research to be conducted on the evolution of 
China‘s coal to oil industry and the policies guiding its development. Numerous studies 
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have looked at more popular aspects of China‘s energy sector, such as renewable energy, 
China‘s national oil companies, and China‘s growing natural gas consumption. China‘s 
energy security problem and strategies have also been written about and discussed in 
great length. But with coal to oil, most articles have focused mainly on the technical or 
economic aspects of the industry. No study that I am aware of has yet looked closely at 
the ongoing evolution of China‘s coal to oil industry, how China‘s resource geography 
has created some of the challenges facing the industry, or what the governance of this 
industry reveals about China‘s energy and resource management policies in general. In 
short, there is a gap in the literature about China‘s coal to oil industry, despite the 
significance of this industry to China‘s future development. 
By analyzing how China is managing the development of this relatively new 
component of its energy sector this study will make three main contributions to the 
literature. First, it will record and describe the early evolution of China‘s coal to oil 
industry and the specific steps the government has taken to influence or adjust the 
trajectory of its development. Second, it will contribute to the larger body of knowledge 
on China‘s energy policies, the factors influencing energy policymaking, and China‘s 
methods for managing energy resources. Finally, this study will help inform those 







1.3 Research Methodology 
Research for this study was conducted in China and the United States from 2006 
to 2010. From 2006-07, while at Portland State University, I began exploring this subject 
as a result of my interest in the impact coal to oil might have on China‘s environment, its 
carbon emissions, and its energy security. Between fall 2007 and fall 2009, while 
studying Mandarin Chinese intensively in Changchun (Jilin Province) and Beijing, I 
continued following this industry and researching all aspects of China‘s energy sector as 
a way to understand the position of coal to oil projects. Much of this research was 
informal and took a variety of different forms, including attending over a dozen energy 
conferences of varying size in China; informally interviewing Chinese and foreign 
experts about coal to oil technologies and how the industry related to China‘s overall 
energy sector; and using Chinese-language publications on coal to liquids and China‘s 
energy policies in my Chinese classes. My research also benefited from the fact that from 
2008-09 I was a student at Tsinghua University, China‘s foremost research university for 
energy and climate issues, which gave me ample opportunity to meet Chinese and foreign 
professors knowledgeable about coal to oil and China‘s energy sector and to include the 
study of energy topics in my formal language training.  
 This informal research was buoyed by the time I spent interning at the U.S. 
Department of Energy‘s (DOE) Beijing Office in the summer of 2009. In this capacity I 
was able to participate in meetings between DOE and important actors in the coal to oil 
sector, such as the Shenhua Group and Sasol; interact with and interview some of the 
leading experts on coal to oil and carbon capture and storage technologies in the world; 
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and attend meetings with high-ranking officials from the energy departments of both 
countries. As the information obtained through these activities and interviews was off the 
record and informal, none will be cited in this study. Nonetheless, they helped inform my 
overall understanding of the coal to oil industry, how it is developing in China today, and 
the factors driving or slowing its development.  
Since returning from China in September 2009, I have read dozens of Chinese-
language journal articles, news reports, and government announcements related to coal to 
oil. The information used in this study and cited throughout consists primarily of 
government policy pronouncements, industry press releases, news articles, and scholarly 
research. Both English and Chinese language sources are used and the translations are my 
own.  
 
1.4 Research Barriers 
By choosing what in hindsight is a very challenging subject to study, I encountered 
numerous obstacles. Arguably the most significant has been learning the details of an 
extraordinarily complex subject that is typically the domain of engineers. As will be 
discussed in greater depth later, ―coal to liquids‖ (of which coal to oil is one component) 
is a broad field that incorporates everything from ―coal to methanol‖ to ―coal to dimethyl 
ether‖ – essentially any process that converts coal into a liquid of any form (or a gaseous 
intermediary for later conversion to a liquid). Coal to liquids is also part of a larger 
industry, known as the ―coal chemical‖ industry, which in addition to coal to liquids 
incorporates a range of coal gasification processes, including coal to natural gas and the 
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production of coke, calcium carbide, and ammonia. Coal can be converted into a wide 
array of products through the use of different engineering processes, and each process 
has its own unique energy, resource, and environmental implications. These products can 
then be used for purposes as diverse as making plastics, generating electricity, or 
powering an automobile, and they can be blended, upgraded, and refined. Thus, 
formulating a research topic that is manageable in scope and academically sound within 
this field has required a methodical approach that included an enormous amount of 
independent research and reading. While only a subset of the knowledge gained in this 
process will be conveyed in this thesis, the background research was necessary in order 
to grasp and contextualize the final topic, coal to oil. All of this research and learning 
was done independently without formal classes or close mentoring by subject-matter 
experts. 
 A second challenge has been researching an industry that is still developing and is 
a moving target. Over the past four years it has alternately appeared that the government 
was either fully behind developing a massive coal to oil industry or that it was halting all 
development. Conflicting reports about the actual status of different coal to oil projects 
or plans for the industry abound, and often articles appearing at almost the same time in 
the media were in direct contradiction to each other. Equally challenging is the fact that 
many projects have been ―announced‖ over the years, which can mean any number of 
things, including that that a company is speculating about developing a project, that a 
feasibility study is underway but no construction has taken place, that a project has been 
started but government approval has not been received, or that a project has started 
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production. Considerable research and the comparison of contrasting reports is required 
in order to be able to determine the actual status of an announced project. 
 Finally, a third significant research barrier is that this study is focused wholly on 
China. As is well known by those who have conducted research on China, information is 
not always readily available, what information is available may not be accurate, and 
much of what is available is only published in Chinese. In addition, China is changing so 
rapidly that even those most informed about a subject, whether Chinese or foreign, likely 
do not know the full story or exactly what is happening. Early on in my research, one of 
my information sources observed that, ―if somebody claims to know exactly what is 
happening in China, immediately discount anything they say. Nobody knows exactly 
what is happening in China, not even the Chinese themselves.‖ I have found this to be 
more true than otherwise. China is so vast and its population so large that contradictions 
in policies and information abound. Two examples of this are China‘s one-child policy 
and the household registration (hukou) system. How these policies are applied often 
differs not only among provinces and regions in China, but often within provinces 
themselves. The same is true with energy policies and developments. 
 To facilitate my conducting of research on coal to oil and China‘s energy sector, I 
spent four years studying Mandarin Chinese, including two years of intensive language 
study in China. By the summer of 2009 I was able to read newspapers and scholarly 
articles and to conduct interviews with minimal translation assistance or use of the 
English language. The most significant benefit derived from this language training is the 
ability to read Chinese publications and conduct internet research using Chinese sources. 
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Coal to oil receives nowhere near the press coverage in the West as do issues like energy 
security, climate change, or renewable energy. Therefore, trying to determine what is 
actually happening ―on the ground‖ in China, both in terms of government policies and 
project developments, has required considerable research and reading of Chinese sources. 
Because of time and space considerations, only a small portion of that research will be 
included in this study, but without the ability to read Chinese I would not have been able 
to dive as deeply into this subject. At times I have used the Chinese language text 
translation software Wenlin and Google Translate to assist in my research.  
 
1.5 Committee Composition 
My thesis committee is composed of my primary advisor, Gil Latz, Professor of 
Geography and Vice Provost for International Affairs; Martha Works, Professor of 
Geography; Jiunn-Der 'Geoffrey' Duh, Assistant Professor of Geography; and Mel 










Chapter 2: China‘s Energy Resource Endowment, Energy Security Policies, and Role of 
Coal to Liquids 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the background information necessary to 
understand why coal to oil is, at least in theory, an attractive energy strategy for China. 
China‘s pursuit of a coal to oil industry is driven by a combination of long-term 
economic trends, its resource endowment, and foreign policy considerations. As this 
chapter will show, the idea of converting coal into synthetic oil as an energy security 
strategy is perfectly rational within the context of China‘s current domestic and 
international conditions. This chapter will explore the different macro-level trends 
driving China to explore coal to oil projects, and will provide background about coal to 
oil technologies and the history of the industry.  
  
2.2 China‘s Energy Resource Endowment 
China‘s rapid economic growth over the past 30 years has been described as one 
of the greatest economic success stories of modern times. The reforms that China 
initiated in the late 1970s have lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty and improved 
the living standards of many more.  
From 1979 (when economic reforms began) to 2008, China‘s real gross domestic 
product (GDP) grew at an average annual rate of nearly 10%. From 1980 to 2008, 
China‘s economy grew14-fold in real terms, real per capita GDP (a common 
measurement of living standards) grew over 11-fold, and hundreds of millions of 
people were raised out of extreme poverty. By some measurements, China is now 
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the world‘s second largest economy and some analysts predict it could become 
the largest within a few decades. (Morrison, 2009, 1) 
 
While this growth has benefited China and the world economy, it has also led to 
rapid growth in China‘s energy demand. Between 1990 and 2006, China‘s total primary 
energy demand grew from 863.2 million tons of oil equivalent (MTOE) to 1,878.7 
MTOE in 2006, an average annual growth rate of 5.0% (ADB, 2009, 148). The past 
decade in particular has seen a significant spike in demand. ―Between 1978 and 2000 the 
Chinese economy grew at 9 percent while energy demand grew at 4 percent. After 2001, 
economic growth continued apace, but energy demand growth surged to 13 percent a 
year‖ (Rosen and Houser, 2007, 4). In spite of the challenges this has posed for China‘s 
energy infrastructure and energy reserves, China‘s energy resource endowment has, for 
the most part, enabled supply to keep up with demand.  
China‘s energy resource endowment is distinguished by an abundance of coal and 
relatively small reserves of oil and gas. China‘s coal reserves, the third largest in the 
world after the United States and Russia (BP, 2010), have allowed China to maintain an 
energy self-sufficiency rate of over 90 percent (State Council Information Office, 2007), 
with coal completely dominating China‘s fossil fuel reserve base. China‘s fossil fuel 
reserve base consists of 2.8 billion tons of petroleum, 3.0 trillion cubic meters of natural 
gas, and 326 billion tons raw coal, meaning coal constitutes 97% of the fossil fuel reserve 
base by energy content (Figure 1). By contrast, in 2007, 62 percent of the world‘s 
conventional fossil fuel reserves were coal by energy content, with oil and natural gas 





Source: Aden, Fridley, and Zheng, 2009, figure 2. 
Figure 1. Energy Content of China‘s Fossil Fuel Reserve Base, 2007 
 
  This disproportionately large endowment of coal resources has led to coal 
becoming the backbone of China‘s energy sector, with oil, natural gas, and hydroelectric 
power rounding out the energy mix. The DOE‘s Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
estimated that coal, oil, gas, and hydroelectric power combined to make up over 98 
percent of China‘s total energy consumption in 2006, with coal alone contributing 70 
percent (2009). Nuclear energy and energy generated from wind, solar, and biomass are 
beginning to contribute more to China‘s energy sector, but their present contribution to 
China‘s overall energy sector remains small in relation to coal or other fossil fuels 





Source: Rosen and Houser, 2007, figure 16. 
Figure 2. China‘s Energy Supply by Fuel, 2005 
 
China is the world‘s largest producer and consumer of coal in the world (BP, 
2010). China consumed an estimated 2.7 billion tons of coal in 2008, representing 
roughly 45 percent of the world total and a 129 percent increase since 2000 (DOE, 2009; 
World Coal Institute, 2009). In spite of massive demand China has traditionally been 
self-sufficient in coal, with 2009 the first year on record in which China was a net coal 
importer (Yu, 2010). Although total coal demand is projected to grow to between 3.81 
billion and 4.26 billion tons in 2025, China will still be relying on coal for over half of its 
energy consumption in 2030. China‘s massive coal endowment leaves it well positioned 
to use domestic production to meet growth in demand, with net coal imports projected to 
remain small in 2030 (IEA, 2007, 342). Putting aside the environmental problems 
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associated with coal, having enormous coal reserves is a boon for China‘s economy and 
energy security as it allows China to meet its energy demand without being overly 
dependent on energy imports or subject to energy market price fluctuations. 
China‘s oil sector, however, is facing a completely different situation. Demand is 
growing rapidly and domestic production, already relatively small, has nearly peaked and 
will soon start declining. In 2006, China produced 3.7 million barrels per day (mbd) of oil, 
and production is expected to level off at about 3.9 mbd in 2012. Production is then 
projected to enter a long period of gradual decline to 2.7 mbd in 2030 (IEA, 2007, 320). 
This decline has enormous implications for China‘s energy security as China is already 
the third-largest net oil importer in the world, behind the United States and Japan, and 
domestic demand will continue growing well into the future (DOE, 2009). 
 
2.3 China‘s Energy Security Dilemma  
China‘s main source of energy insecurity is its growing dependence on imported 
oil. During the 1950s, China met its growing demand by importing oil from the Soviet 
Union and relying on Soviet technological assistance to develop its domestic oil industry 
(Zha, 2005, 39). In 1960, China opened the Daqing oilfield and by 1963 was producing 
over 88,000 bpd, allowing it to claim energy self-sufficiency. Increases in domestic oil 
production enabled China not only to keep up with its own growth in oil consumption, 
which had reached 1.77 mbd in 1980, but to export oil as well. China became Asia‘s 
largest oil exporter in 1983, and by the mid-1980s, was the sixth largest producer of 
20 
 
crude oil in the world (Ebel, 2005, 7-9). This situation changed dramatically in the 1990s 
as domestic economic growth drove increasing demand for energy and oil in particular.  
China became a net oil importer in 1993 and between 1990 and 2006 oil demand 
grew from 2.4 mb/d to 7.2 mb/d in 2006 (Rosen and Houser, 2007, 19). The gap between 
domestic oil production and demand continues to grow; demand reached 7.8 million bpd 
in 2008, with imports growing to approximately 3.0 million bpd (DOE, 2009). Although 
projections about the future vary, most foresee China importing over two-thirds of its oil 
needs by 2030. The International Energy Agency (IEA) in 2007 projected that China‘s oil 
demand would grow to 16.5 mb/d by 2030, with oil-import dependence growing to 13.1 
mb/d (or approximately 79 percent dependency on oil imports) (Figure 3) (2007, 288). 
Meanwhile, the Asian Development Bank projects that China‘s ―net oil import 







Source: IEA, 2007, figure 10.6. 
Figure 3. China‘s Oil Balance in the IEA 2007 World Energy Outlook Reference 
Scenario 
 
According to Zha Daojiong, Director of the Center for International Energy 
Security in China, despite some variations between estimates and projections, there is 
convergence on one conclusion: 
no matter how China plans and carries out its energy policies, dependence on 
imported oil will have to continue. There is also convergence over the view that 
domestic oil production will stagnate. China therefore will have no choice but to 
rely on imported oil accounting for a growing proportion in its total oil 
consumption to satisfy the demands of its economic development. (2005, 42)   
 
Under these changing conditions, the term ―energy security‖ has taken on new meaning 





China‘s shift to a net importer of oil in 1993 introduced the term ―energy 
security‖ to Chinese discourse on energy. It was not until 2000, however, when 
China‘s oil imports doubled and the bill tripled, that energy security became a 
common theme of public discourse. A search of the ―China Economic News‖ 
library of China Infobank, a database of Chinese periodicals, reveals the term 
―energy security‖ appeared in only forty-one publications from 1994 through 
1999, but in 1,150 publications from 2000 through 2005.(2006) 
 
The dramatic rise of oil prices between 2001 and 2008 underscores the problems posed 
by reliance on imported oil in China. However, because oil is not easily substituted for, 
the government has few good options for how to resolve the problem. But before 
addressing China‘s pursuit of energy security, and the potential role of coal to oil in this 
pursuit, it is important to clarify the meaning of ―energy security‖ and define the term in 
a Chinese context.   
 
2.4 The Meaning of Energy Security in China 
Oil, refined into liquid fuels, is an essential ingredient for economic growth and 
currently remains the most cost-effective and efficient fuel choice (as gasoline, diesel, or 
jet fuel) for transportation. Because of oil‘s critical importance to daily economic 
functions, countries heavily reliant on oil imports are often faced with a stark choice: 
either rely completely on international oil markets and associated risks such as potential 
economic disruption as a result to supply shortages or price shocks, or expend 
considerable political and monetary capital (usually in the form of national defense 
capabilities) to ensure the steady flow of oil to in order to meet national needs. China, 
because of its growing dependence on foreign oil, is now grappling with the same energy 
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security vulnerabilities facing most other oil-import dependent countries; for the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP), the stakes are arguably higher than they are for the leaders of 
democratic countries, given the role the Party plays in managing the economy and the 
extent to which its legitimacy rests on sustaining economic growth. 
According to Daniel Yergin, Chariman of Cambridge Energy Research Associates 
(CERA), the goal of energy security ―is to assure adequate, reliable supplies of energy at 
reasonable prices and in ways that do not jeopardize major national values and 
objectives‖(1988, 11). Put simply, energy security means access to adequate, affordable, 
reliable supplies of energy. For geographically large countries endowed with abundant 
energy reserves, such as China and the United States, basic energy security has less to do 
with international relations and more to do with domestic energy policies, energy 
infrastructure development, and effective resource management, which is to say the first 
task of government is to harness domestic resources to provide adequate, reliable energy 
to its citizens. The most fundamental form of energy security, and the one most 
responsible for improving standards of living, is simple access to energy (usually in the 
form of electricity). China is over ninety percent self-sufficient in energy; in comparison, 
the US is over seventy percent self-sufficient (Yergin, 2007). Both countries are 
approaching electrification rates of 100 percent. However, these types of statistics are 
misleading because it is not energy per se that is a source of insecurity. For most 
countries, oil is the reason why security is a major factor influencing how economies 
conduct their foreign policies and international relations. In many respects, oil supply 
security has become synonymous with energy security. 
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  In China, energy security can be defined as ―the acquisition of sufficient energy 
supplies to protect the Chinese leadership‘s core objectives at prices that are neither too 
high nor too low to undermine those objectives. Reliability, for oil and natural gas, 
includes the safe delivery of imports to China‖ (Downs, 2006, 13). The CCP‘s highest 
priority is staying in power, and factors that will determine its ability to stay in power 
include ―ensuring domestic order and development, which are critical to the preservation 
of the power and legitimacy of the Communist Party; defending China against foreign 
threats to both territory and sovereignty; and attaining high levels of international power 
and prestige‖ (Swaine, 2008, 75). All of these issues, to a greater or lesser extent, would 
be affected by a disruption to China‘s oil import supply, making reliable access to oil of 
critical importance.  
Countries reliant on imported oil have good reason to be concerned about oil 
supply security. Some of those concerns include that the region supplying the highest 
percentage of the world‘s oil, the Middle East, is chronically on the verge of war or 
instability; there is a strong likelihood that world oil production is nearing or has reached 
its peak, even as demand continues growing; and oil prices have recently rose from $20 
per barrel at the end of the 1990s to almost $150 per barrel in 2008 and are currently 
(Summer 2010) hovering around $70 per barrel. For China, distrust of the U.S. makes 
China‘s growing reliance on imports all the more alarming. Many in China subscribe to 
the theory that global oil production has peaked, or that at least it will not increase 
dramatically in the coming years, and they therefore worry about the ability of global oil 
production to keep pace with growing demand. How this concern relates to U.S.-China 
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relations was articulated by Professor Shen Dingli of Fudan University when he asked ―If 
world oil stocks were exceeded by growth, who will provide energy to China? America 
would protect its own energy supply. The U.S. is China's major competitor‖ (Goodman, 
2005). Others point out that China‘s 
distrust of energy markets is aggravated by the perception that these markets are 
dominated by the United States, a perception that overlaps with concerns that the 
United States is out to exploit China‘s energy weakness. Based upon strategic 
dominance in the Persian Gulf, the US Navy‘s control over critical energy 
transport sea lanes, and enormous power in the global oil industry and institutions, 
many (in China) believe the United States exerts a powerful influence on global 
oil prices and flow. (Lieberthal and Herberg, 2006, 16) 
 
For China‘s leadership, perhaps no oil supply vulnerability is more disconcerting 
than U.S. control of global sea lanes of communication, and energy security concerns are 
thought to be a major driver of the People‘s Liberation Army-Navy‘s (PLAN) 
modernization efforts (Cole, 2006, 8). ―At present, China lacks the naval power necessary 
to protect its sea lanes of communication. Beijing fears that during a national security 
crisis ships carrying energy resources could be interdicted by hostile naval forces. Any 
disruption to the free flow of energy resources into China could derail the economic 
growth on which the Chinese government depends to shore up its legitimacy and pursue 
its great power ambitions‖ (Storey, 2006). This worry is especially salient in the Strait of 
Malacca, through which over four-fifths of China‘s oil imports pass. These concerns over 
oil-import security, coupled with the financial burden of having to buy vast quantities of 
oil on the international market, have driven the Chinese government to take a host of 
measures aimed at enhancing energy and oil security and minimizing their exposure to 




2.5 China‘s Response to its Energy Security Dilemma and the Role of Alternative Fuels 
 China‘s attempts to ameliorate its energy security dilemma include both domestic 
and international efforts. The international components of China‘s energy security 
strategy include, among others, developing a blue water navy, constructing pipelines to 
connect China with the energy exporting countries on its periphery, and investing in oil 
reserves abroad. These activities and their geopolitical implications have been discussed 
at great lengths by others and will not be reviewed here. China is also taking significant 
steps domestically to minimize the energy security risks associated with oil-import 
dependence. These include improving fuel efficiency by setting high miles per gallon 
standards for automobiles; incorporating natural gas into the public transportation sector; 
promoting energy conservation; investing in public transportation; incentivizing the 
development of electric automobiles; building a strategic petroleum reserve; and, most 
relevant to this study, developing alternative fuels. Given that China will inevitably be 
reliant on liquid transportation fuels for many years to come, the development of 
alternative fuels is an important component of China‘s energy security strategy.  
There are many different definitions ―alternative fuels.‖ The Environmental 
Protection Agency‘s website defines alternative fuels as “Substitutes for traditional liquid, 
oil-derived motor vehicle fuels like gasoline and diesel. Includes mixtures of alcohol-
based fuels with gasoline, methanol, ethanol, compressed natural gas, and others.‖ The 
U.S. Department of Energy‘s definition includes not only the fuels traditionally thought 
of as alternatives to gasoline and diesel, such as biodiesel, hydrogen, and ethanol, but also 
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fuels that create gasoline and diesel through alternative processes. In China, the definition 
of alternative fuels simply means those liquid fuel products which can substitute for oil, 
specifically those derived from coal and biomass (Hu, 2007). Because alternative fuels 
may help ease China‘s oil import burden, the development of alternative fuels has been 
named as a priority in a number of government reports and proclamations (iCET, 2008). 
Understanding the differences among different alternative fuels, and the feedstock 
used to produce them, is a science in itself. For example, the feedstock used to produce 
alternative transportation fuels include biomass, coal, and natural gas, and the end 
products can take many forms, including methanol, ethanol, biodiesel, dimethyl ether 
(DME), liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), and diesel (World Coal Institute, 2006). In this 
study the focus will be on the synthetic oil made from coal. 
 
2.6 Defining Coal to Oil and Imposing Limitations on the Scope of This Study 
The term ―coal to liquids‖ is vague and does not make clear what type of liquid 
product is actually produced. The DOE defines coal to liquids as the processes of 
converting coal from a solid state into a range of fuels and chemicals, including 
transportation fuels such as gasoline, diesel, and methanol. These ―liquid‖ fuel products 
and chemicals can be used as heating fuel, supplements to or alternatives for traditional 
transportation fuels (such as methanol and DME), traditional transportation fuels 
themselves (gasoline and diesel), and petrochemical feedstock. In the United States coal 
to liquids is understood to mean the conversion of coal into liquid fuels, but in China the 
terminology is different, reflecting the diversity of uses for coal as a feedstock in 
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industrial processes. While there is a general term in Chinese for ―coal to liquids‖(mei ye 
hua), it is seldom used; more descriptive terms are generally favored. 
In China, coal conversion processes are first broken into two categories: 
traditional and modern, both of which include liquids as some of the resulting end 
products. Using Chinese definitions, traditional coal conversion processes yield the end 
products of synthetic ammonia, methanol, coke, and calcium carbide. Modern coal 
conversion processes generally result in synthetic oil products, olefins, DME, natural gas, 
and ethylene (NDRC, 2009). There are specific terms used to describe each end product, 
such as coal to olefins (mei zhi xiting), coal to dimethyl ether (mei zhi erjiami), or coal to 
natural gas (mei zhi tianranqi). For the purposes of this study I am using the term ―coal to 
oil‖ (meizhiyou) to describe the process of converting coal into synthetic oil for later 
upgrading into gasoline, diesel, or jet fuel. However, to avoid confusion, I will not 
abbreviate the term CTO as this is the abbreviation used for coal to olefins, and I will 
instead write out the term in full.  
Limiting the scope of the study to coal to synthetic oil is necessary given the scale 
of the industry and the complexity of the topic. But focusing only on coal to oil has 
important drawbacks that will significantly limit this study as it excludes other liquid 
fuels made from coal and ignores the extent to which coal can be used as a substitute for 
oil in other industrial processes. Many of the conversion plants making gasoline and 
diesel from coal also make other products that can be used either as a heating, cooking, or 
transportation fuel. While some of these end products may be used as transportation fuels, 
they might also be used for purposes that are completely different from oil use, in which 
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case they do not directly contribute to China‘s energy security by replacing imports or 
increasing domestic production of ―oil.‖ Not only is it difficult to determine the 
approximate output of products other than synthetic oil at a given plant, it would be 
nearly impossible to trace the end use of the different products to determine how they are 
used.  
By focusing on gasoline and diesel made from synthetic oil I can be certain that 
these products are contributing to China‘s energy security. At the same time, I am also 
overlooking the production of other coal-based fuels that may also be used in ways 
similar to synthetic oil. An example of this problem is methanol. China is already 
producing large quantities of methanol, made from both natural gas and coal. Methanol 
made from coal can be blended with gasoline and then used in automobiles as a 
transportation fuel, or it can be converted into ethylene or propylene for use in the 
petrochemical sector. Without highly detailed information, it is difficult to know how the 
methanol is made (i.e. from coal or natural gas) or how the methanol is being used. 
Discounting methanol and other products makes my study manageable, but it overlooks 
the important role other coal conversion processes might play in boosting China‘s 
production of liquid fuels.  
Similarly, the conversion of coal into industrial feedstock, such as those needed 
by the petrochemical industry, is in itself an oil substitution strategy. As the name would 
suggest, the feedstock for the petrochemical industry has traditionally been petroleum. In 
China, the chemicals and petrochemicals sector produces such products as ammonia, 
methanol and various petrochemicals, including ethylene, and is the third-largest 
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industrial energy consumer in China (IEA, 2007, 295). At the same time, the chemical 
and petrochemical sectors accounts for a majority of the oil consumed by industry, which 
is 32 percent of total oil consumption (Guth and Ginsberg, 2004). Thus, using coal 
conversion processes to create petrochemical feedstock can enhance China‘s energy 
security by meeting the ―petroleum‖ demand of the petrochemical industry with domestic 
coal resources. All of this is to say that by focusing exclusively on coal to oil I am 
looking at the subsector of coal to liquids that will make the most direct contributions to 
China‘s energy security, while choosing not to analyze the extent to which ―coal to 
liquids‖ in general can reduce China‘s import dependency or increase domestic 
production.  
Finally, many coal conversion processes are similar in terms of water 
consumption, coal consumption, and greenhouse gas emissions. By excluding all forms 
of coal conversion except coal to synthetic oil from my analysis, I am will not examine 
how China‘s larger coal to liquids and oil-replacement strategy will affect China‘s 
environment and resource base, even though this is an important subject worth 
examination.
 China‘s coal to liquids industry is enormous and coal to oil is but a small 
part. But given the potential size of the coal to oil industry in China and the potential 
impact of this industry on China‘s environment, this study will contribute to 
understanding the difficult decisions confronting China‘s policymakers as they balance 





2.7 History and Processes of Coal to Oil 
Coal to oil is not a new industry or new industrial process. Coal to oil was first 
used by the Germans during World War II as a response to Allied embargo of Germany‘s 
oil supply. Germany‘s industrialization of the process was so successful that more than 
92 percent of Germany's aviation fuel and half its total petroleum needs during World 
War II were met by synthetic fuel plants. At its peak in early 1944, the German coal to oil 
effort produced more than 124,000 barrels per day from 25 plants (DOE website). An oil 
embargo drove Japan, too, to experiment with coal to oil during WWII, specifically in 
Northeast China (or Manchuria), but with much less success. Even the United States, 
facing oil shortages during the war, passed the Synthetic Liquid Fuels Act in 1944, which 
provided $30 million for a five-year effort to produce synthetic liquid fuels from coal and 
other organic material (DOE website). But abundant, cheap oil following the war 
dampened interest in the coal to oil industry, and although several development programs 
remained in operation in the U.S. and other countries, South Africa has been the only 
country to commercialize coal to oil in the post-WWII era.  
Beginning in the 1950s, South Africa began subsidizing coal to oil development, 
partially out of fear that its oil imports might be sanctioned because of its apartheid 
policy. In total, Sasol (South Africa‘s flagship energy and chemicals company) has over 
50 years of experience converting coal to synthetic oil and today South Africa derives 
over 40 percent of its gasoline consumption from liquefied coal (Gibson, 2007). 
Following the oil shocks of the 1970s, coal to oil development projects were initiated 
with renewed interest in the U.S., Japan, and other countries heavily dependent on oil 
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imports, but again the availability of abundant, cheap oil made large-scale coal to oil 
projects uncompetitive and unattractive. It has only been the past ten years, as oil prices 
and global energy demand began to surge, that coal to oil has reentered the global energy 
dialogue.  
 
2.8 Coal to Oil Processes: Direct and Indirect 
There are two main types of coal to oil processes, known as direct and indirect, 
with the latter being the most common. The indirect coal to oil process begins with coal 
gasification, which involves reacting coal with steam and oxygen at elevated 
temperatures and moderate pressures to produce a mixture of hydrogen, carbon monoxide, 
and carbon dioxide. After leaving the gasiﬁer, the gas contains carbon dioxide and other 
impurities. Once impurities such as sulfur and mercury have been removed, and excess 
carbon dioxide is released into the atmosphere (in the absence of carbon capture and 
storage), the remaining mixture of hydrogen and carbon monoxide is known as synthesis 
gas, or syngas. The syngas is then sent through a process known as Fischer-Tropsch 
synthesis, where it is catalytically converted to a mixture of hydrocarbons. This mixture 
generally includes hydrocarbon gases similar to those found in gasoline, diesel, and jet 
fuel, as well as heavier compounds that are categorized as waxes. After further treatment, 
the end result is retail-ready diesel fuel (or a combination of diesel fuel and jet fuel) and 
naphtha. The naphtha can be upgraded into gasoline, or it can be converted to ethylene 
and related chemical feedstock (Bartis et al. 2008). 
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 In the direct liquefaction process, a slurry comprising ﬁnely ground coal and a 
solvent is heated to temperatures above 400 degrees Celsius in a pressurized vessel 
containing hydrogen and an appropriate catalyst. The coal is converted into a liquid, 
separation and further conversion takes place, and the end result is synthetic crude oil. 
Through distillation naphtha and middle distillates are recovered, which can then be 
upgraded into gasoline, diesel, or various chemical products (Williams and Larson, 2003).  
 Through both of these processes coal is converted into products typically made 
from petroleum, which enables coal to substitute for petroleum in the industrial value 
chain. While economic issues, not technological barriers, are the main reason coal to 
liquids is not in greater use today, there are important resource and environmental issues 
associated with the coal to liquids process. 
 
2.9 Coal to Oil Resource Impacts and Economics 
The following sections outline the impact of coal to oil processes in terms of coal 
consumption, water consumption, and greenhouse gas emissions, and provides an 
overview of the economics of coal to oil projects.  
 
2.9.1 Coal Consumption 
Coal to oil is a large and inefficient user of coal resources. It takes approximately 
3.5-5.0 tons of coal to produce one ton of liquefied product regardless of which method 
(direct or indirect) is used. Developing a large-scale coal to oil industry thus has 
significant implications for the coal industry and coal resources (and by extension the 
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environment) for any country seeking to bring this industry to scale. The result is that for 
countries without abundant coal resources, coal to oil not an attractive strategy. Japan, 
which does not have significant coal reserves, determined in the 1980s that using coal to 
oil as an oil replacement strategy would only shift Japanese dependence on imports from 
oil to coal. Alternatively, for countries rich in coal resources, such as the U.S., China, 
Australia, and South Africa, coal to oil is potentially viable as a means of increasing 
reliance on domestic, rather than imported, oil production. But regardless of the country 
or the size of its coal resources, the sheer volume of coal consumed by a large-scale coal 
to liquids industry would have a dramatic impact on the domestic coal sector (Bartis et al. 
2006, 6). 
 
2.9.2 Water Consumption 
The process of converting coal into gasoline, diesel, or any other liquid fuel 
consumes large quantities of water. As one source explains, 
Water is a vital part of the process, either as hot steam or as a feedstock for 
hydrogen production. Water for cooling and the boiler must also be provided, and 
for a larger plant the amount of water consumed can be very large indeed. Water 
consumption is approximately equivalent for DCL and ICL…Therefore, water 
availability is an essential factor to be considered during placement of CTL-
facilities. (Höök and Aleklett, 2009, 8) 
 
There are many factors that determine the exact volume of water consumed per 
ton of liquid fuel produced, including the design of the plant, the type of technology used, 
the quality of the coal consumed, and the humidity and temperature conditions at the 
plant location (DOE/NETL, 2006, 20). The numerous variables involved lead to different 
estimates for the water to product ratio, with the range generally falling between 5-10 
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tons of water consumed per ton of liquid fuel produced (NETL, 2003, 20; IEA, 2007, 357; 
Nolan). For the purposes of this study, I will use the figures most often quoted in 
reference to China‘s CTL industry, which is approximately 8-10 tons of water consumed 
per ton of product produced. 
 
2.9.3 Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
The coal to oil process produces large volumes of carbon dioxide. Experts agree 
that ―Examining the entire fuel cycle, producing and using diesel fuel and gasoline 
derived from coal will yield much higher greenhouse-gas emissions than producing and 
using fuel derived from conventional petroleum‖ (Bartis et al. 2008, 31). Various studies 
have shown that without carbon capture and storage (CCS), coal to oil‘s mine-to-wheels 
greenhouse gas emissions would be 2.0 to 2.2 times higher than the well-to-wheels 
emissions associated with fuels produced through the refining of conventional light crude 
oils (Figure 4) (Bartis et al. 2008, 31; Hawkins, 2006, 4). Carbon dioxide is released at 
both the coal to oil production plant and from the exhausts of the vehicles that burn the 
fuel. In the indirect method, CO2 is released during the snygas preparation process, while 
in the direct method coal gasification is used to produce hydrogen and the CO2 is vented 
into the atmosphere. The use of CCS can remove most of the CO2 produced during the 
coal conversion process, but CO2 is still released during the combustion of the liquid fuel, 






Source: Environmental Protection Agency 
Figure 4. Comparing the Greenhouse Gas Emissions of Different Fuels 
 
2.9.4 Economics  
While energy security concerns provide an incentive for governments to consider 
developing coal to oil, the primary reason energy companies and coal-producing states 
have become interested in coal to oil in the first decade of the 21
st
 century is the pursuit 
of profit. Soaring international energy prices and a growing recognition that global oil 
production might not be able to meet demand growth indefinitely has led many to view 
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coal to oil as a potentially lucrative industry. With the days of $15-20 barrels of oil gone 
forever, and demand for oil still growing, many kinds of energy that were once viewed as 
too expensive are being reconsidered. Ultimately, the same factor that prevented coal to 
oil‘s large scale development over the past fifty years - oil prices - is now driving energy 
and coal companies to look anew at coal to oil.   
The profitability of coal to oil projects is determined by comparing the cost of 
producing a barrel of synthetic oil from coal with the price of a barrel of oil on 
international markets, which can be summarized as follows:  
 
If [coal to oil] production costs, including a reasonable rate of return on capital  
investments, are below the prevailing market price for oil, a domestic CTL 
industry will generate economic profits. For example, if CTL production in 2030 
costs an average of $40 per barrel and world crude prices are between EIA 2007 
reference-case and high-oil-price levels, the economic profits of a three million 
bpd domestic CTL industry would range from $20 billion to $70 billion per year 
(in 2007 dollars). (Bartis et al. 2008, 60)  
 
Estimates vary on the exact price point at which coal to oil becomes profitable 
because of the large upfront investment costs of building a plant and the price volatility 
of other inputs such as steel for construction, the cost of coal, and labor. In general, costs 
in China are estimated to be much lower than in countries like the U.S. or Australia 
because of inexpensive coal and lower construction and operating costs. According to 
one 2007 report  
It has been estimated that, using current processes, the threshold of profitability 
for USD 20/ton coal may be reached for a crude price of about USD 70/bbl, a 
figure that has been largely exceeded on the spot market in 2007. The cost of 
USD 20/ton of coal is attained at top- performing mines, but it remains well 
below international prices. That's why, initially, projects like this will only be of 
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interest to countries that not only possess coal resources in abundance but are also 
seeing high domestic demand for liquid motor fuels. (Marion, 2007, 4) 
 
In China the break-even point for coal to oil profitability is thought to be lower. Li 
Yongwang, chief scientist of the coal to oil task force of the Shanxi Coal Chemical 
Research Institute, estimated in 2009 that ―Based on current coal prices, the costs of an 
indirect coal to oil plant would be about $50 dollars per barrel. Larger production scales 
and better technology could, in time, help reduce the volume of coal needed. In that case, 
the cost might fall closer to 40 U.S. dollars per barrel‖ (Xinhua, 2009). Zhang Yuzhuo, 
CEO of China‘s Shenhua Group, has estimated that his company‘s production cost of 
synthetic crude is less than $40 dollars per barrel (CCTV, 2009). Overall, most experts in 
China agree with the estimate of needing an international oil price of between $40-50 per 
barrel for coal to oil to be profitable in China. However, the enormous capital costs of 
building a coal to oil project, coupled with the long construction times, makes it difficult 
for companies other than Sasol of South Africa to be certain about the exact profit point, 
and much also depends on the type of government support and the terms of financing the 
projects receive. 
 
2.10 Geographical Prerequisites for Building a Coal to Oil Plant 
The resource and environmental needs of the coal to oil process impose 
limitations on which countries are reasonably able to pursue such projects and where 
plants can be located within countries. In general, countries might choose to pursue coal 
to liquids for one of two reasons. The first is to improve energy security by using the coal 
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to oil process to increase the domestic production of synthetic oil products and ease 
dependence on imports. The economics of production is a second potential factor, one 
that is related to high oil prices which, correspondingly, make coal to oil projects a 
profitable alternative to creating liquid fuels from petroleum. For countries without large 
domestic coal reserves, pursuing coal to oil makes little sense on either account; the coal 
consumed by the coal to oil industry would either have to be imported or would have to 
be shifted away from other domestic uses, and the cost of importing coal would likely 
make coal to oil uneconomical. For this reason, the only countries that have seriously 
considered or utilized coal to oil in recent years are the United States, China, India, 
Australia, South Africa, Indonesia, and Germany - all countries with abundant or 
relatively large coal reserves (World Coal Institute, 2006). 
 For countries that choose to pursue coal to oil, the geographic distribution of 
domestic water and coal resources within the country largely determines where coal to oil 
plants can be built. In general, a coal to oil plant must be located in a setting that meets 
two conditions: at or close to a mine that produces large quantities of coal; and in close 
proximity to a reliable water source (Gibson, 2007). In the case of the former factor, the 
mine location, the price of coal is lower thereby avoiding the high costs of transportation 
and the tight profit margins associated with coal to oil projects. In term of proximity to 
water sources, the large volumes of water consumed by coal to oil plants make it 





2.11 Why CTL is an attractive strategy for China 
The makeup of China‘s resource endowment, its growing demand for liquid 
transportation fuels, and the goal of minimizing reliance on imported oil have combined 
to make coal to oil an attractive strategy. Against this backdrop, and with the resource 
conditions in place to exploit coal to oil technology, two developments over the past ten 
years have accelerated China‘s pursuit of coal to oil.  
The first factor was the realization by the central government of just how 
dependent China was becoming on imported oil. As recently as 2000, China imported 
less than a quarter of its oil consumption and few at that time foresaw the economic boom 
China was about to enter. But by 2005, as the economy grew by close to ten percent and 
oil demand accelerated rapidly, China‘s leadership increasingly came to recognize how 
dependent it had become on foreign oil and the transportation routes upon which imports 
depended. As a result, China began taking more concrete steps to manage demand, to 
secure resources abroad, and to develop alternative fuels at home. 
The second factor was the precipitous rise in international oil prices. Between 
2000 and 2008, oil prices rose from a low of $23 per barrel to a high of $145 (DOE, 
2009). Because of the nature of energy pricing in China, where fuel and electricity prices 
are controlled and set artificially low by the National Development and Reform 
Commission, the rise in energy prices created an enormous challenges for the 
government as it attempted to meet growing demand, keep energy affordable 
domestically, and manage conflicts of interest created by the disparity between domestic 
and international prices. An article in the Shanghai Daily in 2008 described the problem 
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succinctly, ―A renewed fuel shortage has hit many Chinese cities over the past weeks, as 
independent refiners cut output to narrow their losses from the government's cap on pump 
prices. This may pressure the government to reconsider its fuel price-setting policy, 
which is designed to tame inflation and shield low-income groups. Short supplies during 
the peak summer season may also spark social unrest.‖  
Were China able to boost domestic oil production, it would alleviate at least some 
of the financial pressures created by buying high-priced oil on international markets. As 
one energy expert in China, coal to liquids will ―offer an efficient way to quench China's 
thirst for energy. It is conducive to reducing China's external dependence on crude oil‖ 















Chapter 3: Energy Policymaking in China: Three Core Challenges 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Before examining the development of China‘s coal to oil industry and analyzing 
how the government has managed the industry, it is first necessary explore some of the 
characteristics of energy policymaking and energy resource management in China. The 
need to effectively manage scarce resources, support economic growth, enhance energy 
security, and account for the interplay between energy resource development and local 
conditions is not unique to the coal to oil industry. Rather, this challenge comes into play 
with a range of different energy issues as the government formulates energy policies that 
attempt to balance competing demands and priorities, account for the needs of different 
constituencies, while at the same time avoid sacrificing national priorities. In any system, 
there are invariably trade-offs involved, and many factors aside from resource 
endowments or energy demand inform energy and resource management policy decisions. 
Some of these tradeoffs have little to do with pure resource management per se, but 
involve balancing the demands of different actors or bureaucracies, and the process is 
often messier than meets the eye. This is especially the case in China, where by virtue of 
its size, political legacy, and breakneck growth, the inputs into the energy policymaking 
system are complex and hugely consequential. One of the goals of this study is provide 
an overview of that complexity by incorporating not only the resource and environmental 
challenges issues related to coal to oil development, but also the political, social, and 
economic factors influencing coal to oil policies.  
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In this chapter I will review existing literature to explain the observations of 
scholars who have studied China‘s energy sector. My focus will be on three of the 
primary factors thought to influence and complicate energy policy in China. These three 
topics each have direct relevance to understanding how and why the coal to oil industry 
has developed in China, and the challenges confronting the government as it attempts to 
formulate policies to govern the industry.   
 
3.2 Fragmented and Weak Bureaucracies 
China‘s energy policies are not made or driven by a single bureaucratic institution 
that makes rational, calculated decisions about the direction of the energy sector. On the 
contrary, institutional weakness is one of the greatest impediments to China creating 
more effective energy policies. Since reform and opening in 1978, the institutions 
governing China‘s energy policies have been in a perpetual state of revision and 
reshuffling. Previous government agencies tasked with managing China‘s energy sector 
include the State Energy Commission (1980-82), the Ministry of Energy (1988-93); the 
National Development and Reform Commission‘s (NDRC) Energy Bureau (2003-08); 
the Energy Leading Group and State Energy Office (both established in 2005): the 
National Energy Administration (NEA) (established in 2008); and, most recently, the 
National Energy Commission (established in 2010). According to Erica Downs, ―The 
formal bureaucratic organizations within the central government that comprise China‘s 
energy bureaucracy have been in a state of flux since the founding of the People‘s 
Republic as the Chinese government has repeatedly sought to create a more effective 
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institutional structure to manage the country‘s growing demand for energy‖ (2007, 68). 
The lack of a strong, centralized energy institution has made governing China‘s energy 
sector and effectively managing energy resources an ongoing challenge.  
Today, it is the NDRC and NEA (which is within NDRC) that are primarily 
responsible for setting energy policy. But their decisions often must be coordinated with 
or are in competition with the authority and interests of other ministries and agencies, 
including the Ministry of Land and Resources, the Ministry of Water Resources, the 
Ministry of Science and Technology, the State Electricity Regulatory Commission, the 
Ministry of Railways, and the State Environmental Protection Agency (Kong, 2005, 21; 
Meidan et al. 2009, 596). Although it is too early to assess the role of the NEC, this new 
agency is likely to be constrained by the same problems that have plagued past energy 
agencies, including a lack of political authority, an inability to balance the interests of 
competing stakeholders, and a lack of financial and human resources (Downs, 2007, 86; 
Downs, 2006, 20-22; Kong, 2006; Andrews-Speed, 2004). The result over the years has 
been an increasingly fragmented institutional structure of authority, difficulty formulating 
coherent policy, and competition with state-owned energy agencies for policy control 
(Andrews-Speed, 2004, 57).   
Until 1979, China‘s energy sector had been organized as a vertically integrated, 
top-down, state-owned utility. Once economic growth became the overarching priority 
during the Deng Xiaoping era, authority over China‘s energy sector was delegated from 
an elite few into the hands of various ministries and provinces, giving rise to what 
Kenneth Lieberthal and Michael Oksenberg have dubbed ―fragmented authoritarianism.‖ 
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Their 1988 study on policymaking in China, which focused on energy policy, ―reveals a 
fragmented bureaucratic structure of authority, decision making in which consensus 
building is central, and a policy process that is protracted, disjointed, and incremental.‖ 
Scholars over the years have echoed their findings, namely that the policy making 
process is arduous, that most policies are shaped over a long period of time, and that ―the 
lack of a cohesive, consistent national energy development policy is quite evident‖ 
(Lieberthal and Oksenberg, 1988, 22-24).  
According to Bo Kong, it is unclear who actually makes energy policy in China 
and the multiple layers in China‘s energy policymaking structure fragment and paralyze 
the process. Overall, he describes China‘s energy policies as ―diffuse, overlapping, ad-
hoc, and ill-coordinated‖ (Kong, 2005, 21-23). Edward Cunningham seconds this 
conclusion, finding that ―government actors – even at the central level – are plagued with 
vague and conflicting interests resulting in stillborn energy institutions that historically 
have failed to produce focused energy policy‖ (Cunningham, 2007, 1). Phillip Andrews-
Speed identifies structural issues as at the root of China‘s energy policy-making problems, 
and concludes that the  
weaknesses in China‘s current energy policy can be traced primarily to the 
structure of policy-making. The fragmented institutional structure of the energy 
industry is almost bound to lead to a fragmented energy policy. In the absence of 
a Ministry of Energy, policy is developed more by the aggregation of the specific 
industry objectives driven by the leaders of these industries than by the 
formulations of sector-wide initiatives. (Andrews-Speed, 2004, 75)  
 
The MIT Future of Coal Report make a similar observation when discussing China‘s 
energy bureaucracy, stating: 
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[the] responsibility for energy pricing, for the approval of infrastructure projects, 
for the oversight of state energy companies, and for long-term energy policy is 
spread across many agencies, most of them seriously understaffed, and some of 
which – given their very recent emergence on the scene – are notably weak in 
relation both to other agencies and to the players they are supposed to be 
regulating. (MIT, 2007, 64)  
In sum, one of the greatest obstacles challenging China‘s energy governance is 
the lack of a strong, well-funded ministry or department of energy that can contend, on 
even footing, with the numerous bureaucratic and private-sector stakeholders. The 
leading energy bureaucracy of any country invariably faces an array of problems; in 
China, the situation is made worse by a lack of authority, manpower, and expertise. Thus, 
one of the key factors to be evaluated in this case study of China‘s coal to oil industry is 
the extent to which the central government‘s energy institutions are able to formulate a 
coherent coal to oil policy that fits rationally within China‘s overall energy strategy. Has 
the government been able to formulate policy in a timely fashion that indicates control 
over the various interests and stakeholders involved, or is it reactive and creating policies 
ad hoc as developments on the ground proceed ahead of its control?  
 
3.3 Powerful Energy Companies 
 A second key feature observed by those studying energy policy and energy 
resource management in China is the disproportionate influence of state-owned energy 
companies. While the energy institutions responsible for governing China‘s energy sector 
and formulating industry-wide energy policies are understaffed, often underfunded, and 
lack political authority, China‘s largest energy companies employ tens of thousands, have 
their own well-staffed energy research institutions, and often have direct access to the 
47 
 
senior leadership in Beijing. This is largely the result of historical legacy as many of the 
large state-owned energy companies in China were once ministries themselves and held 
considerable sway over China‘s national energy and economic policies (Downs, 2006, 
21). In the 1980s and 1990s, the government began eliminating special line ministries, 
such as those in charge of the coal and petroleum industries, and created state-owned 
energy companies in their place (Kong, 2006). This transition has affected China‘s 
energy governance in two important ways. 
 First, the newly-formed state-owned energy companies often took with them the 
entrenched organizational culture and expertise that had been developed over decades 
(Downs, 2007, 71-72; Kong, 2006, 73), with the result that while the government has 
undergone periodic reshuffling and reorganization, state-owned companies are among the 
most coherent entities in the energy sector. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) ―are the 
organizations that are most capable of defining their own interests and that are most 
likely to act, making decisions that their ostensible state regulators and overseers can 
barely keep up with and sometimes do not even monitor‖ (Lester and Steinfeld, 2006, 2-
3). The pull of higher salaries has also challenged the government‘s ability to retain 
highly qualified staff members, leading to a decline in talent within the government and 
an increase in lobbying power for the energy companies (Kong, 2006, 74).  
Second, without a powerful Ministry of Energy with the same standing as other 
ministries or the energy companies, the powerful state-owned companies retain an 
advantage over the institutions attempting to govern them.  
When the Chinese government began to restructure the country‘s ministries into 
corporations in the 1980s, the leaders of the companies fought to retain their bureaucratic 
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ranks to retain their leverage over the policymaking process… They can contact China‘s 
leaders themselves rather than going through the energy bureaucracy, which increases 
their power relative to that of the country‘s energy institutions. (Shirk, 1993, 107-08).  
 
With the government institutions responsible for overseeing large and diverse 
portfolios of responsibility, not to mention the task of interacting with foreign 
interlocutors, it is difficult for those in charge of energy policy to stay ahead of activities 
on the ground in China. The result is that government energy institutions, while 
nominally in charge of energy policy, must compete with much larger entities for access 
to the political leadership, intellectual capital, and influence over China‘s energy policies. 
Powerful energy companies have also been known to pursue their own interests to 
the detriment of China‘s energy security, and their intransigence has at times created 
disruptions in the functioning of China‘s economy. Examples of problems or disruptions 
resulting from public-private energy conflicts include pricing disputes between power 
producers and coal companies that led to electricity shortages in 2008 (Xinhua, 2008); the 
government‘s inability consistently control or direct the activities of national oil 
companies abroad (Zha, 2010); and the illegal export of crude oil and pricing disputes 
between the government and national oil companies that resulted in fuel shortages in 
2005 (Bradsher, 2005). Thus, state-owned energy companies not only exert influence 
over energy policy, but also sometimes disobey the policy directives of the central 






3.4 Challenges of Decentralization 
One of the keys to China‘s rapid economic development over the past thirty years 
has been economic and political decentralization. The planned economy had in the past 
been controlled by Beijing and an elite group of leaders, whereas reform and opening 
allowed the provinces to exert greater control over their economic destiny. The 
effectiveness of this reform and of market forces in general lifted hundreds of millions 
out of poverty. However, one consequence of decentralization has been the relinquishing 
of absolute authority over how the provinces developed economically, including the 
central government‘s absolute control over energy infrastructure development. As 
observed by Lieberthal and Oksenberg, ―The formal organizational charts and the 
structure of authority suggests the top leaders are efficiently in command of the 
bureaucracies and the policy process. But at the provincial and local levels, the reality 
frequently diverges sharply from the policies proclaimed in Beijing, and orders from the 
center often are not scrupulously implemented in the provinces‖ (1988, 32). 
Noncompliance and the failure of provinces or lower levels of government to implement 
policy are especially evident in China‘s energy sector. Case studies have repeatedly 
shown that there is a disconnect between the central government‘s policy 
pronouncements and the actual implementation of those policies at the provincial level.  
 Provincial governments are often unwilling to follow central government edicts 
when it conflicts with their own domestic economic policies, and they often use creative 
methods for circumventing central government policies. A prime example is the 
construction of illegal power plants. In 2005 the NDRC, under orders from Chinese 
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Premier Wen Jiabao, issued a directive ordering local officials to clamp down on 
unauthorized power plants, the total amount of which was estimated to be between 120-
140 GW (Modern Power Systems, 2005, 5). As one article pointed out, the fact that these 
plants are illegal ―means neither that the plants are hidden in a closet nor that they lack 
any governmental oversight. What it does mean is that they are not part of a coherent 
national policy, that they are frequently outside national standards, and that they often 
evade control even by their ostensible owner at the national corporate level‖ (Lester and 
Steinfeld, 2006, 7). The central government has also had difficulty controlling the 
number of small coal mines, the proliferation of biofuels plants, and the construction of 
golf courses. The MIT Future of Coal report sums up the situation, saying 
the remarkably rapid growth of energy consumption in China has been possible 
because a host of infrastructural issues are being resolved very quickly by 
individuals and organizations operating well below the level of national energy 
corporations. Almost daily, actors at the grass roots level are making key 
decisions about China‘s physical and technological infrastructure—decisions with 
profound consequences for its long-term energy development. (2007, 63)  
 
As mentioned above, these developments do not take place beyond the purview of 
local authorities, but rather are hidden from the national government as provincial and 
municipal leaders pursue economic growth to advance their political careers or for 
economic gain. In short, the devolution of authority from the Center to the provinces over 
the past thirty years has weakened the traditional levers of authority exercised by Beijing, 
hampering the government‘s ability to control development in the provinces and manage 





Chapter 4: The Evolution of China‘s Coal to Oil Industry 
 
4.1 Introduction  
In the following chapter, I will describe the evolution of China‘s coal to oil 
industry and the government‘s various attempts to manage or shape its development. By 
describing in detail both the industrial development of the industry and the government‘s 
specific policy statements and directives, the stage can be set for answering the questions 
driving this study.  
 
4.2 Early History of Coal to Oil Development in China 
China began developing its domestic coal to oil technologies in the 1980s with the 
establishment of a coal liquefaction laboratory within the China Coal Research Institute 
during the 6th Five Year Plan period (1981–1985). The laboratory was supported by the 
State Planning Commission, the Science and Technology Commission, and the Ministry 
of Coal Industry; over the following fifteen years the laboratory collaborated with foreign 
technology providers to conduct market studies in China of three DCL technologies (Sun, 
2010, 14). By the mid-1990s coal to oil was gaining strategic significance due to China‘s 
new reliance on imported oil. According to the Zhang Yuzhuo of China‘s Shenhua Group 
(henceforth to be called Shenhua), the largest coal mining company and the driver of coal 
to oil development, ―Thirty years ago, China had started research into CTL, learning from 
Japan, Germany and USA. A turning point came in 1993 when China became a net oil 
importer, resulting in a foreign currency deficit (unlike today). The government 
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responded by using coal in place of fuel oil‖ (IEA, 2006, 31). A further turning point for 
coal to oil development came in 1998, when China‘s State Council gave Shenhua $1.3 
billion to develop a coal to oil project as part of a ―coal replacing oil fund‖ (Sun, 2008).  
China‘s first CTL project, however, was a failure. Launched in 1999 in 
Pingdingshan, Henan province, the project was designed with a 500,000 ton annual 
capacity, but the coal to be used proved unfit for liquefaction and the project was 
terminated shortly thereafter (Qi, 2006) (Figure 5 ). Coal to oil development was 
expanded and accelerated in 2001 when energy technologies were included in China‘s 
national 863 Program. The 863 program was originally started in 1986 to help China‘s 
civilian scientific research establishment catch up with modern advances in all fields of 
technology, and energy technologies were included in the 863 program in response to 
China‘s growing reliance on imported oil and the environmental impact of its heavy 
reliance on coal. Clean coal became a core focus of the 863 Program and increased levels 
of funding began flowing into research on coal gasification, coal to liquids, and other 




Figure 5. Approximate Location of Ordos, Inner Mongolia and Pingdingshan, Henan. 
 
Following the problems at Pingdingshan, Shenhua took the lead in coal to oil 
development and completed a feasibility study on the construction of a large-scale direct 
CTL plant in 2002. In late 2003, construction of the plant began in Majiata of Ordos City, 
Inner Mongolia (Figure 5). By the time construction was underway, the price of a barrel 
of oil had risen to $37 dollars in 2004, up from just $12 in 1998, and China‘s energy 
demand growth was exceeding nearly all previous expectations. These factors – rising 
energy prices and growing demand for oil – combined to accelerate government and 
private sector interest in coal to oil in China and to jump-start the industry. The period 
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from 2004 to the present, during which most coal to oil development activity has taken 
place, is the focus of this study.  
 
4.2 The Evolution of China‘s Coal to Oil Industry and Policies 
After construction commenced on Shenhua‘s one million ton per annum coal to 
oil plant in Inner Mongolia, domestic and international coal mining and energy 
companies rushed to invest in an industry that looked set to boom. Sasol of South Africa 
was one of the first international companies to pursue coal to oil opportunities in China. 
Between February and June of 2004, Sasol met multiple times with representatives of the 
NDRC‘s indirect coal to oil working group in Beijing and South Africa. It was reported 
in 2004 that Sasol and Shenhua were considering entering into a 30 billion Renminbi 
(RMB) joint-venture to produce gasoline and diesel out of coal, and that Sasol would 
study the feasibility of developing two 3 million ton per annum (mta) plants to be located 
in Shaanxi and Ningxia (Madlala, 2004). In the summer of 2004, Royal Dutch Shell 
(henceforth called Shell) also began talks with the NDRC‘s working group on coal to oil, 
and soon it was announced that Shell would be cooperating with the Shenhua-Ningxia 
Coal Company (a subsidiary of Shenhua) to conduct a pre-feasibility study on the market, 
economics, technical solutions, regulations and possible sites for a proposed 3 mta coal to 
oil plant. By all appearances, the central government appeared to fully support coal to oil 
development, and officials from the NDRC were endorsing coal to oil as part of China‘s 
overall plan to reduce the nation‘s reliance on crude oil (Lim and Ng, 2004).  
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In 2005 and 2006 the rush to establish coal to oil plants in China continued 
gaining momentum, setting off wild speculation began about how much money China 
would invest in coal to oil and how many tons of liquefied coal would eventually be 
produced. Forbes reported in 2005 that China was planning to invest at least U.S. $24 
billion in coal to oil technology to cut its growing reliance on oil and gas imports (2005). 
Shenhua, too, was making bold estimates on how much transportation fuel would be 
produced from coal in the future, with a spokesman announcing in 2004 that Shenhua 
would produce 10 million tons per year of liquid fuel by 2010 and 20 million tons per 
year by 2020 (approximately 200k barrels per day (bpd) and 400k bpd respectively). 
According to a presentation by Shenhua CEO Zhang Yuzhuo at a 2006 IEA conference, 
―Shenhua‘s target in the next 5 years was four plants producing a little over 10 million 
tons of oil equivalent (MTOE) per annum; after that, another five projects were planned 
in the following 5-6 year period. He said many other companies had projects in planning 
that would proceed soon‖ (IEA, 2006, 24). Shenhua later increased its estimates to 30 
mta by 2020, an amount that, based on 2006 estimates, would equal almost 15 percent of 
China‘s projected gasoline and diesel demand for that year (Wang, 2006). The rush to 
build projects was so strong that in 2006 ―almost all coal-producing provinces - Inner 
Mongolia, Yunnan, Heilongjiang, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Shandong, Gansu, Guizhou, Anhui 
and Henan - have [had] CTL plans. One estimate says the total production capability of 
CTL plants that are currently under construction or ready to be kicked off could exceed 
the equivalent of 16 million tons of crude oil‖ (Qi, 2006). Coal to oil looked to be the 
wave of the future, and project announcements, production projections, and the apparent 
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certainty with which those projections were made created the impression that large-scale 
coal to oil development was a foregone conclusion.  
The size of the investments being considered by Sasol and Shell, the two primary 
foreign companies involved in the early stages of the coal to oil rush, was staggering. 
Sasol‘s feasibility studies on two join projects, with the Shenhua-Ningxia Coal Company 
(henceforth to be called Shenhua-Ningxia) at the Ningdong coal chemical base near 
Yinchuan, Ningxia and with Shenhua near Yulin, Shaanxi, had an estimated cost per 
project of US $3-4 billion(Lim and Ng, 2004). The joint project Shell was studying with 
Shenhua, also at the Ningdong coal chemical base in Ningxia, called for investment of 
approximately $5-6 billion (Figure 6) (Oil and Gas Journal, 2006).  
 





Meanwhile, international energy companies were not alone in their pursuit of investment 
opportunities and market share. Domestic Chinese companies such as Yitai Group, Lu‘an 
Group, Yankuang Group, Shandong Lueneng Mining, Xuzhuo Mining Group and others 
were also announcing large-scale coal to oil projects (Forbes, 2005).  
The government‘s support of coal to oil development was on display in June 2006 
when Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visited the site of Shenhua‘s Inner Mongolia coal to 
oil project (Xinhua, 2007a), followed by a visit to the Sasol headquarters in South Africa 
the same month (Sasol, 2006). At the Shenhua plant Premier Wen called coal to oil ―an 
important part of China‘s energy security strategy‖ and a ―major scientific and 
technological experiment;‖ at the same time, he also stated that there should first be a 
pilot project and China should not ―rush into action‖ (yi hong er qi) (Xiao, 2008, 111).  
On July 7, 2006, the government made its first concrete policy statement on coal 
to oil as it took steps to cool down the investment rush. The NDRC‘s ―Notice on 
Enhancing Management of Coal Chemical Projects and Promoting Healthy Development 
of the Industry‖ called for halting the development of all coal to liquids plants that would 
result in less than 3 million tons per annum of liquefied product and raised key concerns 
about the industry (concerns that would appear repeatedly in future announcements). 
While acknowledging the important role China‘s coal chemical industry could play in 
easing China‘s energy demand-supply contradiction by substituting coal for oil, the 
circular pointed out a number of problems associated with the rapid development of the 
industry, including the pressure coal chemical plants place on coal resources, the 
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environment, and water resources, as well as acknowledging the technology- and capital-
intensive nature of the industry (NDRC, 2006).  
Regarding water, the circular mentioned the shortage of water in the regions 
where coal is produced and where coal chemical projects were to be located, and warned 
of the threat to social development posed by projects that consume ten tons of water to 
produce one ton of liquefied coal product. It also specifically pointed out that the annual 
amount of water consumed by a single large-scale coal chemical plant is the equivalent of 
that used by more than ten million people per year, and that the proposed plants have the 
capacity to break the critical water balance in the regions where they are built. Other 
specific problems the announcement cited included: the risks associated with investing up 
to several billion RMB in technologies still in the early stages of development and 
commercialization; the strain rapid growth in the coal chemical industry will place on 
China‘s coal resources; the irresponsible behavior of companies that use coal chemical 
projects to seize valuable coal resources; a concern that most of the projects didn‘t have 
the necessary economies of scale to be profitable; and the risk of overcapacity from 
―blind development‖ (mangmu fazhan) (NDRC, 2006).  
In addition to announcing the moratorium on all coal to liquids projects under   
3 mta, other measures were announced to help guide the industry‘s development. These 
included discouraging local governments from approving new coal to liquids projects 
until the national plan for the coal chemical industry was complete; declaring that only 
projects that have successfully completed the demonstration phase were allowed to 
expand their production size; prohibiting the diversion of water needed for daily life or 
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agriculture to coal chemical projects and recommending strict control over the 
development of coal to liquids projects in areas short of water; discouraging the 
permitting or construction of coal chemical projects that do not have comprehensive 
waste water management systems; and forbidding the breaking of projects into smaller 
parts in order to win project approval or otherwise circumvent the approval processes. 
But in spite of these risks and problems, the announcement ultimately concluded that 
because of the coal to oil industry‘s importance to China‘s oil substitution strategy, coal 
to oil pilot and demonstration projects should be built, the pace of industrialization should 
be quickened, and large scale coal to oil plants should be built in a timely fashion (NDRC, 
2006). 
  This 2006 announcement was a response to the fact that in addition to the large-
scale coal to oil projects already mentioned, other smaller companies, encouraged by the 
government‘s endorsement of coal to oil as part of its energy security strategy, were 
rushing to profit from high oil prices by developing projects. On the heels of the NDRC‘s 
announcement, one of China‘s official news agencies stated  
It is reported that a total of 30 coal liquefaction projects are under detailed 
planning or at the stage of feasibility study in the country. According to 
conservative estimates, the total capacity would exceed 16 million tons, and 
investment would surpass 120 billion yuan (15 billion dollars). Insiders predicted 
that China's annual oil output liquefied from coal will reach 50 million tons by 
2020. (China Daily, 2006) 
 
Producing 50 million tons per year of synthetic oil from coal by 2020, as suggested in the 
article, would have required China to construct the equivalent of ten 5 mta plants or over 
sixteen 3 mta plants in just under 14 years, and also would have committed enormous 
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amounts of coal, water, and capital to the endeavor. Given that in 2006 China had yet to 
successfully develop even one large scale project, the prospect of the industry developing 
to such a massive scale seemed extraordinarily ambitious, if not completely unrealistic. 
Nonetheless, that some ―insiders‖ were making such predictions is an indication of the 
level of private-sector enthusiasm within China for coal to oil, and the potential for 
profits seen by energy and mining companies. Thus, the government was compelled to 
step in and issue a statement that addressed the industry directly in an attempt to prevent 
overheating and discourage small-scale forays into the industry. In spite of this, it is 
worth noting that the announcement was not necessarily a vote against coal to oil 
development, but rather an attempt to slow and moderate its development.  
Shortly after the NDRC‘s July 2006 announcement, in December 2006, the 
NDRC in released for comments a draft of China‘s ―Medium- and Long -Term 
Development Plan for National Coal Chemical Industry.‖ Although only a draft plan 
intended as a starting point for discussions at a meeting of industry and provincial experts 
in Beijing in December 2006, to be later revised (China Chemical Industry News, 2006), 
the ambitious projections contained in the draft for the coal chemical and coal to oil 
industries gained a great deal of domestic and international attention. Most notable was 
the plan‘s call to invest more than one trillion RMB (U.S. $128 billion) in the coal 
chemical industry between 2006 and 2020. According to the plan, China would ―produce 
1.5 million tons of coal-based oil in 2010, 10 million tons in 2015 and 30 million tons in 
2020. Coal-based oil will make up 4% and 10% of total oil product in 2015 and 2020 
respectively‖ (Sina, 2006).  
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Extremely ambitious targets were also set for coal-based methanol, DME, and 
olefins, and the plan called for the creation of seven large coal chemical bases through the 
country. Notably, it stated that ―the middle and lower reaches of the Yellow River, where 
Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi and Ningxia meet, will form China's largest substitute fossil-
fuel production base, producing 11 million tons of coal-based oil and 7 million tons of 
dimethyl ether annually‖ (Figure 5) (Asia Times Online, 2006).  
 
 
Figure 7. Approximate Location of China‘s Largest Substitute Fossil-Fuel Production 
Base  
 
The draft plan also called for the construction of a pipeline to transport fuels 
produced in the middle and lower reaches of the Yellow River basin to consumption 
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centers in Beijing, Tianjin, and Tangshan. The proposed pipeline would be 2000 km long 
and be built with a total investment of 8 billion RMB (approximately one billion dollars) 
(Asia Times Online, 2006). Thus, in spite of the concerns about runaway development, at 
the end of 2006 it still appeared the Chinese government fully supported the development 
of a massive coal to oil industry.  
Beginning in 2006, there were also indications that perhaps not all decision 
makers in the government supported coal to oil development. In October 2006, an official 
from the powerful Development Research Center of China‘s State Council dismissed coal 
to oil as irresponsible and inefficient, citing coal to oil‘s low energy efficiency and high 
carbon dioxide emissions (Biopact, 2006). Later, in June 2007, an unnamed official from 
the NDRC was quoted as saying China was considering halting the development of all 
coal to oil projects because of their high capital costs, lack of mature technology, and 
high demands on both coal and water resources (Xinhua, 2007).  
The high stakes of coal to oil investments and their potential impact on China‘s 
energy security led to vigorous debate within the academic and policy community in 
China starting in 2006. Dozens of articles were published analyzing the logic and 
rationale for coal to oil, with conflicting views and opinions the norm.  
Those arguing in favor of coal to oil cited energy security concerns and the 
coming era of high international oil prices, the need to domestically develop advanced 
clean coal technologies (Wang, 2008, 16), and the role coal to oil projects might play in 
opening up and developing China‘s interior and less-advanced provinces, both by 
creating jobs and stimulating the economy (Meng et al. 2008, 80). Supporters also 
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continued to make bold predictions about the future size of the industry and its potential 
energy security contributions. In 2007, for example, the China Coal Science Academy‘s 
Coal Chemical Department predicted that by 2020 China would be producing 50 million 
tons of oil from coal, and that 400 billion RMB would be invested in the industry 
(Economic Information Daily, 2007). Provincial authorities, among others, touted the 
importance of coal to oil to China‘s energy security. "It is very important to promote 
industrial-scale coal liquefaction," said Zhao Shuanglian, vice-chairman of the Inner 
Mongolia Autonomous Region. With CTL projects, "we can turn coal mines into oil 
fields to ensure energy security for China" (Xinhua, 2009). 
Persuasive arguments in opposition to the coal to oil industry were being made by 
academics, industry experts, and officials with ties to the government. The opposition 
cited the industry‘s prohibitively large coal and water demands, the immaturity of 
existing technologies, and large carbon emissions as reasons to halt or minimize 
development. Others argued that unless coal to oil was developed on a massive scale it 
would only have a minimal impact on China‘s overall foreign oil dependence – and even 
then it wouldn‘t solve the country‘s energy security problem. An example of an article 
opposing coal to oil development was published in Chemical Engineering and Equipment 
by the Fuzhou Information Technology Research Center, in which the author lists seven 
reasons why China should think hard about developing coal to oil. First, the author argues 
that China may not be as rich in coal as people often assume given the rate at which it is 
being depleted and China‘s large population. Second, because of coal to oil‘s large CO2 
emissions, vigorously developing coal to oil would be contrary to the successful 
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implementation of China‘s national climate change program. Third, coal to oil‘s large 
water demands combined with the requirement that plants be built in parched coal-rich 
provinces like Shanxi, Shaanxi, and Inner Mongolia, means that such projects will not 
only worsen the water situation in the areas they are built, but that a prolonged drought 
could affect the plants‘ ability to operate normally. Fourth, the ecological impact of the 
plants would be large due to their enormous size, their waste water emissions, and the 
number of people they would employ. Fifth, coal to oil plants are extremely inefficient 
users of resources. Sixth, the unproven nature of much of the technology and the 
enormous capital investment needed to build a plant makes for enormous risk. Finally, 
bringing coal to oil to scale in China would exert tremendous pressure on China‘s coal 
resources, which would not only drive up the price of coal and diminish the profitability 
of the plants, but deplete China‘s finite coal resources in a shorter period of time (Xiao, 
2008).  
On energy security, an additional article pointed out that Shenhua‘s near-term 
projection of 3 million tons of synthetic oil per year was only equivalent to 2-3 tankers 
worth of oil, and that for China, with its massive and growing oil demand, this amount is 
but a drop in the bucket (bei shui che xin) (Chu, 2008, 16). Others questioned the logic of 
using one finite resource to substitute for a different finite resource. Zhou Dadi, Director 
Emeritus of China‘s NDRC-affiliated Energy Research Institute, was quoted in 2009 as 
saying ―coal to oil is not feasible in China…to use one scarce resource to replace another 
scarce resource is worth nothing‖ (Mu, 2009, 80). In general, numerous articles and 
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statements over the past five years show that many within China questioned the wisdom 
of developing a coal to oil industry.  
Signals from the government, although generally supportive of coal to oil 
development, offered few clear directives. In 2007, the government released two 
important reports: ―The Eleventh Five-year Plan for the Coal Industry‖ and the ―The 
Eleventh Five-year Plan for Energy Development.‖ The Eleventh Five-year Plan for 
Energy Development, published in April 2007, called for speeding the development of the 
coal to oil, biofuels, and coal chemical industry as part of China‘s oil replacement 
strategy, while The Eleventh Five-year Plan for the Coal Industry (published three 
months later) called for developing China‘s coal-based liquid fuels sector and established 
the goal of having one million tons of coal to liquids production at the industrial 
demonstration phase by the end of the eleventh five year plan (2006-2011). Other 
government announcements that touched on coal to oil were also equal parts supportive 
and vague. For example, other announcements advocated for ―the sustainable 
development of coal-based clean fuels and the comprehensive, efficient utilization of coal 
resources‖ (iCET, 2008, 39). In general, most policy statements made through 2007 and 
2008 were supportive of coal to oil development, and of coal to liquids development in 
general, but they were also vague in their prescriptions, did not differentiate clearly 
among the various subsectors of the coal to liquids industry, and did not set any 
meaningful long-term targets or goals.  
 On August 4, 2008, over two years after its last announcement about the coal to 
oil industry, the NDRC issued its most definitive statement to date, ordering that all but 
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two of China‘s coal to oil projects be halted. The two projects allowed to continue 
developing were Shenhua‘s indirect coal to oil project underway in Inner Mongolia 
and the planned joint venture between Shenhua-Ningxia and Sasol in Ningxia, which 
was still in the feasibility study stage. The reasons given for all but halting 
development were almost identical to those cited in 2006, including the environmental 
pressures associated with coal to oil (and other coal chemical processes), such as high 
carbon dioxide emissions; large water demands in draught-stricken regions; the fact 
that coal to oil is ―a technology-, talent- and capital-intensive project, but most 
domestic enterprises lack advanced technologies, management experience and 
equipment‖ (China Daily, 2008); the inefficient use of coal resources by coal to oil 
projects; and the large capital investments needed and accompanying financial risk 
(NDRC, 2008; Zhang, 2008).  
As in earlier statements and media reports, it was still estimated that ―the output 
capacity of the existing and the planned CTL projects combined to equal roughly 16 
million tons, with investment planned at 120 billion yuan (US $17.55 billion) (China 
Daily, 2008). In a 2008 article by Pan Liansheng of China‘s powerful State Council 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, the situation was 
described as ―All kinds of businesses, all kinds of funds have entered the coal chemical 
industry, including coal companies, power companies, chemical companies, state funds, 
private funds, domestic funds, international funds. The scale is so big, the investment is 
so huge, the pace of action is so fast that it leaves people speechless‖ (ling ren ze she) 
(Pan, 2008, 1).  
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Reaction to the NDRC‘s announcement was mixed. Some in the industry 
bemoaned the darkened prospects for investment in coal to oil created by the 
announcement, while others praised the foresight of the NDRC in light of the technical, 
financial, and environmental obstacles posed by large-scale coal to oil development 
(China Daily, 2008). As the NDRC was making its announcement, world oil prices 
were dropping precipitously from a pre-financial crisis high of $147 per barrel to less 
than $40 per barrel in early 2009. Enthusiasm for coal to oil suddenly seemed to be 
waning and the future of the industry was mired in uncertainty.  
 
4.3 China‘s Coal to Oil Industry Today 
 The most recent announcement from the government regarding coal to oil was 
made by the State Council on September 26, 2009 as part of a larger announcement on 
the problem of overcapacity and duplicated investment in several industries, including 
the coal chemical industry. The announcement called for steadily carrying out 
demonstration projects for the construction of a modern coal chemical industry and 
evaluation of the demonstration work, meaning that some elements of the industry 
would proceed, but it also stated that ―in principle no new projects would be approved 
in the coming years‖ (NDRC, 2009). In a press conference regarding the 
announcement, held on December 30, 2009, Li Ningning, Deputry Director General of 
the NDRC, elaborated on the overcapacity problem in the coal chemical industry, 
stating that the total capacity of announced coal to oil projects in China was now over 
40 million tons per year. Later in the press conference, Long Huayuan, Deputy 
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Director of Raw Materials at the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, 
discussed some of the problems facing the modern coal chemical industry (which 
includes coal to oil), stating:  
The governments in some coal producing regions are one-sidedly pursue 
economic growth regardless of the ecological environment, the water resources 
carrying capacity, and the fact that the modern coal chemical industry is in the 
demonstration phase of development, and they blindly and overeagerly plan 
large-scale modern coal chemical projects without considering the energy 
efficiency of the projects, the availability of markets for those products, or the 
competitiveness of the products.(NDRC, 2009a) 
 
Mr. Long also pointed out the emerging contradiction between the rapid 
development of the coal chemical industry and the availability of water resources in 
coal-rich provinces, reiterating the policy that the government will not approve any 
new modern coal chemical industry demonstration projects for at least three years.  
Present-day information is vague regarding the exact number and status of coal 
to oil plants under construction, undergoing feasibility studies, or announced. When a 
reporter at the 2009 NDRC press conference asked how many coal to oil projects had 
been approved, the question went unanswered. And while some reports have stated that 
over thirty coal to liquids projects were in the detailed planning or feasibility study 
stage, the International Energy Agency estimated in 2009 that over 80 coal to liquid 
projects have been announced in China in the past few years (IEA, 2009, 104). 
Because of the ambiguity in the data, public statements, and terminology, it is almost 
impossible to determine exactly how many plants have been announced, what they will 
produce, how much they will produce, and how far along they are in planning or 
construction. However, based on my research and publicly available information, it 
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appears there are five main projects in operation, under construction, or close to 
beginning construction, and that at the moment these five projects make up the core of 
China‘s emerging coal to oil industry.  
 The project that has received the most attention over the past six years is 
Shenhua‘s direct coal to oil project in Ordos, Inner Mongolia. As mentioned earlier, 
the project construction began in 2004; it is the first large-scale direct coal to oil 
project of its kind anywhere in the world. The project‘s initial phase called for an 
output of one million tons per year of liquefied product, of which seventy percent will 
be diesel. The project will eventually expand to 3.2 mta and then 5.0 million mta 
pending successful completion of each stage. Although the plant was expected to begin 
production in 2008, the project finished its first 300 hour trial run only in December 
2008 (successfully producing quality diesel), and a second trial run of 1000 hours was 
completed in 2010 (Xinhua, 2009). The plant has yet to enter into fulltime operation 
but has tested the diesel fuel in automobiles and is preparing to start the second phase 
of construction pending government approval.  
 A second large-scale coal to oil plant is being planned for Dongning, Ningxia 
Autonomous Region, to be owned, built, and operated by Shenhua-Ningxia Coal 
Company and Sasol. The plant, which is one of the original two Sasol began targeting 
for development as early as 2004, will produce 3.85 million tons of diesel per year 
using the indirect coal to oil method; total investment is estimated at 85 billion RMB 
(approximately $12 billion). The project completed a second feasibility study in early 
2010, had its environmental impact assessment approved by the State Environmental 
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Protection Agency at approximately the same time, and is now applying for approval 
to proceed from the NDRC (Xinhua, 2010).  
The remaining three projects are unique because they were not expressly 
allowed to continue developing in the NDRC‘s August 2008 announcement. Xinhua 
explained the contradiction, stating  
In September 2008, the NDRC followed up with a circular, ordering a halt to 
almost all projects except for the Shenhua Group's direct CTL project and an 
indirect CTL plant proposed in northwest China's Ningxia. The directive, 
combined with the impact of the global financial crisis, cooled enthusiasm for 
many CTL projects in China. However, Yitai Group and Lu'an managed to 
keep their projects on the list. (Xinhua, 2009) 
 
I will later discuss why these projects may have escaped Beijing ban on development, 
but for now it is worth noting the contradiction between the official NDRC statement 
and Xinhua‘s rapid acknowledgement that other projects would continue in spite of the 
restrictions.  
China‘s Lu‘an Group originally received NDRC approval in February 2006 for 
a 160,000 ta coal to oil project, to be situated in Tunliu, Shanxi Province, and on 
December 22, 2008 the plant successfully produced synthetic oil from coal. According 
to the company‘s website, it plans to expand to 3 million tons per year by 2012, add a 
second 3 million ton per year between 2012 and 2015, and eventually produce 15 
million tons of synthetic oil in 2020 by establishing plants in other provinces such as 
Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia. The Lu‘an project uses wholly owned Chinese 
intellectual property produced by Synfuels China, which was ―jointly founded in 2005 
by the Institute of Coal Chemistry, Inner Mongolia Yitai Group, Shenhua Group, 
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Lu‘an Group, Xuzhou Mining Group and Lianshun Energy Co., Ltd‖ (Greencar 
Congress, 2009). 
 China‘s Yitai Group announced a successful test run with its 160,000-ton 
indirect coal to oil facility on March 23, 2009, producing quality diesel oil and naphtha. 
Based in Ordos, Inner Mongolia, Yitai Group‘s coal to oil project was approved by the 
central government in 2005 and began construction in 2006 with an investment of 
nearly 2.7 billion yuan (395 million U.S. dollars (Xinhua, 2009). The final project, by 
China‘s Yankuang Group, received initial government approval in January 2008 for a 
large two-phase coal to oil project in Yulin, Shaanxi Province. The first phase is 
planned for 1 mta and will cost 10 billion RMB (approximately $1.38 billion). The 
second phase, provided the Yankuang project proceeds, will expand the project to 5 
mta and cost an additional 50 billion RMB (China Coal Resource, 2009). Yankuang 
aims to produce 10 mta of oil products by 2020, a plan that will involve a total 
investment of US $8 billion (Steel Guru, 2008). Table 1 outlines the current projects 










Table 1. China‘s Five Flagship Coal to Oil Projects, 2010.  
Owner, Type 
of project  







Phase 1: 3.2 mta 
(broken up over three 
one mta lines);  
Phase 2:5 mt/a 
Phase 1: $3.6 
billion 
Conducting trial 







Phase 1 (trial): 1 mt/a  
Phase 2: 5 mt/a (by 
2013); 
Phase 3: 10 mta 
Phase 1 (trial): 
$1.5 billion 
Phase 2: $7.35 
billion 











Phase 1 (trial): 160,000 
t/a 
Phase 2: 3 mta (by 
2012) 
Phase 3: 6 mta (by 
2015) 




















Phase 1 (trial) 160,000 
t/a Phase 2: 480,000 t/a  
Phase 1 (trial): 
$2.2 billion 







Source: Zhang et al. 2009, table 1.  
 
4.4 Summary  
 Over the past ten years China‘s coal to oil industry has developed from non-
existent to being on the cusp of producing several million tons per year of synthetic oil. 
Beginning in roughly 2004 and lasting until late 2008, ambitious plans were announced 
to invest in and develop a large-scale coal to oil industry in China. Government 
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announcements and early support of coal to oil fed the enthusiasm of domestic and 
international energy companies. In 2006, recognizing the potential for the industry to 
become overheated and associated significant financial risks, and the potentially large 
environmental and resource impact of the industry, the NDRC announced new 
guidelines limiting the development of only the largest CTL projects. The 
announcement did little to halt the rush to invest in coal to liquids, forcing the 
government to announce in late 2008 that all but two projects were forbidden from 
moving forward. Although several proposed projects have announced they would cease 
development, three other smaller-scale projects operated by Chinese companies (and 
using Chinese intellectual property) continued to advance. In late 2009 the government 
announced that no new projects would be approved for at least three years, and that the 
current projects were to focus on solving technical and management challenges, 
achieving industrial scale production, and gathering data on the economics and 
resource impacts of coal to oil.  
As will be explained in greater detail in the following section, it is important to 
note that all five of the coal to oil projects still under development are located in the 
provinces of Shanxi, Shaanxi, Ningxia, and Inner Mongolia (Figure 8, P.71). These 
provinces constitute the heart of China‘s coal industry, and the coal producing regions 
within these provinces are primarily located within the Yellow River basin. This 
industrial consolidation in the Yellow River basin is in line with the development 
strategy in the 2006 draft plan for the Medium- and Long -Term Development Plan for 
National Coal Chemical Industry, which called for making the middle and lower 
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reaches of the Yellow River, where Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi, and Ningxia meet, the 
largest substitute fossil fuel production base (Asia Times Online, 2006). While the 
location of this industrial consolidation is logical given the geographic prerequisites of 
locating coal to oil projects in close proximity to abundant coal resources and a reliable 
water source, the environmental and resource conditions of this region also create 
considerable challenges. The following section will focus on those challenges and the 
other negative externalities created by coal to oil development, as well as the efforts 
that have been undertaken to address them.  
Figure 8. Approximate Representation of Yellow River Basin and the Location of 
China‘s Five Flagship Coal to Oil Projects1 
                                                 
1
 Figure was created using ARC GIS and Adobe Illustrator software, making it impossible to include scale. 
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Chapter 5: Analysis - Focus on Resource and Environmental Issues 
 
5.1 Introduction 
My interest in China‘s coal to oil industry began in 2006 when the ambitious 
plans for developing the industry were first being announced. Between the NDRC‘s 
draft plan for the mid- and long-term development of the industry and the fast pace at 
which foreign and domestic energy companies were announcing projects, it seemed 
that coal to oil development was a foregone conclusion. Assuming that China would be 
producing 10 million tons of synthetic oil from coal by the year 2010, as some were 
predicting, I was intrigued by what this would mean for China‘s energy security and 
yet concerned about the environmental implications. Although industry development 
assumptions have proven to be false and actual production today is less than one 
million tons per year, even at the time I found it hard to believe that China would rush 
headlong into coal to oil development given the industry‘s resource implications and 
the already fragile state of China‘s environment. While the potential energy security 
benefits of increasing domestic ―oil‖ production were significant, so were the potential 
downsides of unfettered development.  
The previous chapter shows that the government in effect has halted industry 
development pending the successful completion of the five projects already underway, 
and that earlier estimates on the size and scope of the industry, particularly with regard 
to timelines, were either premature, overstated, or both. But before drawing 
conclusions regarding the Chinese government‘s management of this industry reveals 
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about energy and resource management policies as a whole, it is helpful to look in-
depth at some of the specific resource, environmental, and human geography issues 
directly affected by this industry and to investigate whether the government has 
attempted to account for them. Focusing on these specific issues will not only shed 
light on the nature and severity of the challenges confronted by the government as it 
pursues coal to oil development, but will also provide an opportunity to dissect the 
responses of both government and industry to these resource and environmental 
concerns. Such additional analysis will help address and answer the first two questions 
of this study
2
, as well as inform later discussion that attempts to situate this analysis 
within the larger body of knowledge about energy sector governance in China.  
The following analysis will focus on three key issues related to China‘s 
resource, human, and environmental geography: the impact of coal to oil projects on 
water resources in the middle and lower reaches of the Yellow River basin; the 
greenhouse gas emissions associated with coal to oil development; and the potential 
impact of a large-scale coal to oil industry on China‘s coal resources. The second half 





                                                 
2
 First, do the energy policies governing the development of the coal to oil industry in China reflect 
awareness on the part of the central government of the potentially negative environmental and resource 
impacts of coal to oil development in China? Second, how has the government attempted to balance 
resource and environmental constraints with the potential benefits of coal to oil? 
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5.2 Yellow River Water Challenges 
 One of the most significant obstacles facing the development of China‘s coal to 
oil industry is the geographic limitation imposed by coal and water needs on where the 
plants can be located. As discussed in chapter two, coal to oil plants need to be located 
close to large coal reserves and near stable supplies of water. But the majority of 
China‘s coal reserves and the heart of China‘s coal mining industry are located in north 
China in the provinces of Shanxi, Shaanxi, Inner Mongolia, and Ningxia, a region 
already facing extreme water shortages. Large swaths of these provinces are within 
China‘s Yellow River basin, and, as mentioned, all five of the coal to oil projects under 
development are located in this watershed (see Figure 8). The region‘s large coal 
reserves and concentration of mining interests also mean that future coal to oil 
development (and coal to liquids in general) will be located here, as indicated by 
preliminary plans to make this region one of China‘s seven coal chemical bases and the 
heart of the coal to oil industry. But the already severe water problems facing the 
region create the risk that a large-scale coal to oil industry will worsen water shortages, 
intensify competition for already scarce water supplies, and could potentially lead to 
social unrest. 
The Yellow River basin is a relatively densely populated, largely rural region 
that is heavily dependent on agriculture. It is relatively poor compared to the rest of 
China, especially when compared to the more developed eastern seaboard.  
According to 2000 statistics, the Yellow River basin is home to some 110 
million people or around 9 percent of China‘s total population….While 
urbanization is increasing rapidly, about ¾ of the basin residents are still 
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classified as rural and most of them depend on agriculture for their livelihood. 
Income levels in the basin are, on average, somewhat lower than national 
averages and the basin accounts for some 7 percent of national output. 
(Giordano et al. 2004, 5) 
 
 Arguably the largest developmental challenge in the basin is water scarcity, a 
problem that is exacerbated by the seasonal variability in Yellow River water flows (60 
percent of Yellow River discharge comes between July and October) (Yang, 2010). 
Northern China has historically has had limited water resources; it is home to 43 
percent of China‘s population but only 14 percent of the country‘s water supply 
(Yardley, 2006). Since the 1980s and the advent of economic reforms, competition for 
scarce water resources has been growing: 
...competition among provinces has put pressures on natural resources within 
and between provinces, especially water in northern China. In the early 1980s, 
as water contradictions grew among riparian regions – especially within the 
Yellow River basin – the central government realized the importance of 
establishing a water allocation institution. (Wang, 2003, 96)   
 
The Yellow River Conservancy Commission is responsible for managing the 
flow of the river and allocating water resources, but growing water demand from 
industry, urban development, and agriculture are exerting growing pressure on water 
supplies. Agriculture currently accounts for 75 percent of the Yellow River‘s total 
water withdrawal, with industrial, urban, and rural uses consuming the remaining 25 
percent (Yang, 2010). Demand for water by all sectors of the economy has placed 
enormous stress on the river. ―Depletion at present means that the Yellow River 
supplies are essentially fully allocated. Since the early 1970s, this has been reflected in 
the complete, or near complete desiccation of the lower reach at certain times each 
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year‖ (Giordano et al. 2004, 8). In 2007-08, total Yellow River basin water 
withdrawals were approximately 45 billion cubic meters (total depletion was 35 billion 
cubic meters), and approximately 76 percent of the river‘s total water resources were 
depleted by human uses.
3
 An additional 14 percent was depleted through river/canal 
evaporation or as other losses. Thus, only 10 percent of the river‘s runoff entered the 
sea, leaving very little excess water for flushing sediment, eliminating waste, and 
maintain a healthy river ecosystem (Zhu et al. 2005, 5). More advanced inter-basin 
water management practices have improved the situation in recent years, but droughts 
and floods remain a serious threats in the region and in 2009 the Chinese government 
was forced to declare its highest-level of emergency because of a severe drought in 
Henan, Hebei, and Shandong (three provinces bordering the lower reaches of the 
Yellow River) (Spiegel, 2009). It is no exaggeration to say that water scarcity threatens 
the livelihoods of tens of millions throughout the region.  
 Pollution is a major problem in the basin. The expansion of energy-intensive, 
heavily polluting industries and urbanization along the lower and middle reaches of the 
Yellow River since the early 1990s have led to large increases in wastewater and 
sewage discharged into the river. ―The Yellow River Conservancy Committee reported 
that 33.8% of the river system's water sampled in 2007 registered worse than level five. 
That means it is unfit for drinking, aquaculture, industrial use and even agriculture, 
according to criteria used by the UN Environment Program‖ (Branigan, 2008). Water 
                                                 
3
 Water depletion is a use of water within the system that renders it unavailable for further use. 
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pollution is China is certainly not isolated to the Yellow River basin or north China, 
but the relative scarcity of water in these regions exacerbates the problem.  
 The water challenges facing Shanxi province are representative of the region as 
a whole. Shanxi is ranked second to last behind Ningxia in terms of total available 
water resources, and the per capita water allocated to residents of Shanxi is only 17 
percent of the national average (and 4 percent of the world per capita average). It is 
estimated that 4.4 million rural village dwellers face drinking water shortages, and the 
groundwater level in Shanxi aquifers are dropping rapidly. At the same time, a 2002 
study reported that ―Every year, in order to extract and clean 300 million tons of coal, 
mining companies pump out and blacken 250 million tons of groundwater, which 
equals the total annual water supply to Taiyuan, the capital of Shanxi.‖ Approximately 
70 percent of this water is then dumped into Shanxi‘s waterways without processing 
(Kim, 2002, 59-60).   
All of the major coal to oil projects under development or in planning stages 
are situated in close proximity to the Yellow River and are located in the middle and 
upper reaches of the Yellow River basin. If the five plants listed above successfully 
complete their trial operations and reach the first stage of their development goals by 
2015, total production would equal approximately 10 mta of synthetic oil. Using 
industry estimates of 10 tons of water consumed per ton of product produced, these 
projects would be consuming approximately 100 million tons of water per year, all of it 
extracted from the Yellow River basin watershed. Should these projects continue 
expanding and eventually produced 20 mta of synthetic oil, water demand would grow 
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to approximately 200 million tons of water per year. While this volume in only a small 
fraction of the river‘s total depletion (approximately one half of one percent), it would 
represent a significant quantity in comparison to total urban, industrial, or rural 
demand (roughly 3-10 percent of each)
4
. Zhang Yuzhuo of Shenhua estimated in 2006 
that allowing his company alone to meet its coal to oil water demands would require 
one percent of the Yellow River‘s water (Wang, 2006). Although the accuracy of this 
statement is questionable, it gives an idea of just how sizeable an impact coal to oil 
would have on water supplies in an area with severely limited water resources. It also 
raises an important question about where the water for coal to oil projects would come 
from. With Yellow River water already over allocated, and industrialization occurring 
at a rapid pace along the Yellow River, unchecked development of coal to oil projects 
would undoubtedly worsen an already severe problem.   
 
5.3 Managing Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Numerous studies have pointed out the severe environmental impact climate 
change is likely to have in China. Problems that China is likely to encounter as a result 
of climactic changes include increased frequency of severe weather events, increased 
variability in precipitation patterns, and the threat of both water shortages and flooding 
as a result of altered seasonal river flows as glaciers melt. According to China‘s 2007 
publication ―China‘s Climate Change Program‖, key sectors adversely affected by 
climate change will include the agriculture and livestock industry, forests and other 
                                                 
4
 Based on Yellow River water figures found in Giordano et al. 2004. 
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natural ecosystems, water resources, and the coastal zones. These changes, should they 
occur, will be destabilizing to China as a whole, and they will affect disproportionately 
China‘s rural population. For these reasons and others, the central government in the 
past five years has taken significant steps to minimize greenhouse gas emissions and to 
reduce China‘s overall carbon intensity.5 While China is unwilling to place a cap on 
its future carbon emissions, it has made ambitious efforts to curb the growth in those 
emissions and to develop renewable, low-carbon sources of energy.  
Developing a large-scale coal to liquids industry would increase China‘s carbon 
emissions and move in the opposite direction that China has charted for an otherwise 
ambitious carbon emissions reduction effort. As mentioned, the process of converting 
coal to oil is extremely carbon intensive and, without carbon capture and storage, 
results in the release of twice as much carbon dioxide as the production process for 
creating gasoline from petroleum in a well-to-wheels analysis. The IEA estimates that 
were China‘s coal to oil production to reach one million barrels per day in 2030 
(approximately 50 mta), the industry would emit between 140 and 250 Mt of CO2, 
depending on the production processes used. The estimates also suggest that should the 
industry reach (only) 30.75 mta, CO2 emissions would be between 100-190 Mt of CO2 
(IEA, 2007, 367). Although this amount is only equivalent to 1-2% of China‘s total 
emissions, it is still significant and would move China away from, rather than towards, 
its goal of becoming a low-carbon economy.  
 
                                                 
5
 Carbon intensity is the amount of carbon dioxide emitted for each unit of economic output. 
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5.4 The Challenge of Sustainably Managing China‘s Coal Resources 
China‘s coal reserves are among the most abundant in the world and coal is 
China‘s primary source of energy. In spite of China‘s efforts to alter its reliance on 
coal by incorporating renewable energy, nuclear power, and natural gas into its energy 
mix, coal will remain China‘s main source of energy for decades to come. The IEA 
forecasts that even under the best case scenario for the policies governing the 
development of China‘s energy sector (known as the ―Alternative Policy Scenario‖), 
coal demand will still increase by approximately 70% between 2005 and 2030 (IEA, 
2007, 364). The Asian Development Bank predicts that coal will account for over half 
of China‘s energy needs (in a significantly larger economy) in 2030 (Figure 9) (ADB, 
2009, 148). 
 
Note: MTOE = million tons of oil equivalent  NRE = New and Renewable Energy 
Source: ADB, 2009, Figure 2.14.3 




Coal, like every fossil fuel, is a finite resource and even China‘s enormous 
reserves will not last forever. The BP Statistical Review of World Energy estimates 
China‘s total proved reserves at the end of 2008 as 114,500 million tons of oil 
equivalent and predicts that, based on China‘s current reserves to production ratio6, 
China‘s coal reserves will last 41 years (2010). In a separate report prepared by the 
Energy Watch Group, the authors concluded that the steep rise in China‘s coal 
production over the past few years ―must be followed by a steep decline after 2020‖ 
and that ―one should not be surprised if the peak of China‘s coal production is not far 
away‖ (2007, 27-29). A report by the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory reaches 
a similar conclusion, stating ―Given the Ministry of Land and Resources estimate of 
189 billion tons remaining domestic coal reserves and the historical production 
trajectory of other coal-intensive countries such as the United Kingdom, Japan, and 
Germany, Chinese production is likely to peak in the foreseeable future‖ (Figure 10) 
(Aden et al. 2009, 33) While China could conceivably rely on coal imports to meet 
domestic demand, doing so would worsen China‘s energy security predicament and 
create economic burdens not unlike those created by reliance on imported oil.  
 
                                                 
6
 If the reserves remaining at the end of the year are divided by the production in that year, the result is the 




Source: Aden et al. 2009, figure A-3. 
Figure 10. Coal Production in China – Scenario Based on Present Reserve Estimates. 
 
As discussed earlier, coal to oil is an inefficient process for utilizing coal 
resources and requires between 3.5-4.0 tons of coal to produce one ton of liquefied 
product. Experts within China have pointed out the inefficiency of coal to oil projects 
and have questioned the wisdom of converting massive amounts of coal into 
transportation fuels. Assuming coal to oil is indeed profitable (not a foregone 
conclusion), coal mining companies naturally have an interest in extending their value 
chains and creating value-added products out of coal rather than just selling the coal to 
electricity producers or heavy industry. But the central government, the NDRC, and 
other ministries, which are responsible for managing the country‘s natural resources, 
must consider the efficiency with which those resources are consumed and the long-
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term pricing and energy security concerns associated with their rapid consumption. 
This is yet another challenge posed by the development of a robust coal to oil industry.  
 
5.5 Assessing the Central Government‘s Efforts to Address the Environmental and  
Resource Challenges Created by Coal to Oil Development 
I have thus far outlined three specific resource and environmental issues that will 
be affected by coal to oil development. The following three sections will address two of 
my key research questions: whether or not the government‘s policies toward coal to 
liquids reflect an awareness of the environmental and resource challenges posed by the 
industry, and how the government has attempted to cope with these challenges. In general, 
I believe there is ample evidence that the government not only recognizes the resource 
and environmental challenges posed by coal to oil development, but is also taking 
concrete steps to mitigate those challenges.  
 
5.6 Efforts to Mitigate Water Resource Impacts from Coal to Oil  
In every government announcement made since 2006 regarding the coal to oil 
industry, water consumption has been mentioned as a top concern. In the NDRC‘s July 
2006 announcement limiting the development of coal to oil projects to plants over 3 
million tons per annum, water was mentioned as one of the negative impacts (buli de 
yingxiang) associated with the rush to develop the coal chemical industry. Statistics were 
given to reflect the extreme nature of the coal chemical industry‘s water consumption, 
including that ―coal chemical projects often use up to several million cubic meters of 
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water‖ and that ―in some areas this is the equivalent to the amount of water used by 
several hundred thousand people or the amount of water held in more than 100 square 
kilometers of land.‖ The 2006 announcement also stated that coal chemical projects 
should ―on the basis of water volumes proceed‖ (liang shui er xing); prohibited the 
diversion of water from agricultural uses to the coal chemical industry; and called for the 
―strict control of coal gasification and coal to liquids projects in dry areas.‖ The use of 
water saving technologies was also encouraged (NDRC, 2006).  
 Concern over the amount of water consumed by coal to oil projects was evident in 
later statements as well. In 2007, when an anonymous NDRC official suggested the 
government was preparing to halt all coal to oil projects, water was cited as one of the 
primary reasons behind this move. In the 2008 NDRC announcement halting the 
development of all but two coal to oil projects, water was again cited for why China 
needed to slow the industry‘s development. Specifically, the statement indicated there be 
determination of ―the security situation of the amount of water needed by coal to oil 
projects‖ (NDRC, 2008).  Most recently, in the December 2009 press conference about 
the NDRC‘s efforts to rein in overcapacity in the coal chemical sector, water concerns 
were included as one of the five contradictions and problems that exist in the coal 
chemical industry. In the press conference, Long Huayuan (Deputy Director of Raw 
Materials in the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology) stated  
China‘s coal resources are mainly distributed in the arid and semi-arid regions of 
central and western China, and in these regions water is scarce and the ecological 
environment is fragile, creating a high industry cost factor. Due to 
overexploitation of groundwater in some areas, surface rivers and wells have 
dried up, and the groundwater table is dropping, creating severe difficulties 
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related to drinking water. The contradictions between the coal chemical industry 
and ecological protection are growing more prominent. (NDRC, 2009a) 
 
In this same press conference officials also scolded those who would blindly develop the 
industry without regard to ecological conditions (NDRC, 2009a).  
 In addition to official government statements, numerous articles written by 
experts and officials affiliated with the government have cited coal to oil‘s large water 
demands as a reason for opposing development or for developing the industry slowly. An 
article published by researchers from the China Chemical Information Center stated that 
relevant water departments have already pointed out that building water intensive 
industries in the middle reaches of the Yellow River ―may lead to water wars between 
industry, agriculture, and ecological needs, and pose a serious threat to provinces in the 
lower reaches of the Yellow River‖ (Pan et al. 2008, 64). Even experts writing in favor of 
coal to oil development point out the water challenges associated with the industry. 
According to Tang Hongqing of Synthetic Oil Engineering Co., Ltd., ―multilevel, large-
scale development of a coal chemical industry will inevitably squeeze agricultural and 
ecological water, damage the environment, and endanger environmental safety. The fact 
that the location of coal and water resources do not match is the coal chemical industry‘s 
greatest obstacle‖ (2008, 16). 
 While it is difficult to determine exactly how different projects plan to meet their 
water needs, the government appears to be monitoring the situation closely and in some 
cases there are plans in place to compensate for the increased withdrawals with savings in 
other sectors. Currently, Shenhua‘s direct coal to oil plant in Ordos, Inner Mongolia is 
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meeting its water needs with water drawn from an aquifer 40-60 miles away. The plant 
will only be allowed to start drawing Yellow River water if it is permitted to expand to 3 
mta and then 5 mta (DeWit and Watts, 2009), a decision that will be based, at least in part, 
on the demonstrated water needs of the first phase of the project. The Shenhua-Ningxia - 
Sasol indirect coal to oil plant to be located in the Ningdong coal chemical base near 
Yinchuan, Ningxia will secure its water requirements from the Yellow River and it is 
estimated that the Ningdong coal chemical base will draw 100 million tons of water from 
the Yellow River every year (Sexton and Li, 2008). Although the Sasol technology 
consumes water more efficiently than other plants, the proposed plant output of over 3 
mta makes it inevitable that it will be a major consumer of water in the province.  
One of the plans under discussion to assist Ningxia‘s adjustment to increased 
water demand is the replacement of inefficient irrigation practices in Ningxia with more 
advanced techniques, thereby freeing up water to be reallocated to the coal to oil project. 
According to the managing director of Sasol Synthetic Fuels International, Ou Boyang , 
―Currently, the efficiency of Yellow River water used in Ningxia for irrigation is very 
low, so the idea of the regional government is to introduce sprinkle irrigation and other 
measures to reduce water demand. At present, the central government and Ningxia 
Autonomous Region government are taking steps to replace water demand‖ (Wang, 
2010a). Wang Zhengwei, governor of Ningxia, explained the plan, saying  
These projects do need a lot of water, but we have adopted measures to use water 
used in agriculture and transfer it to industry. In Ningxia, 93 percent of our water 
is used in agriculture. The method has been approved by the Ministry of Water 




The idea driving this plan represents a rational approach to competing resource 
demand since agriculture is by far the largest consumer of water resources in the region 
and irrigation practices are notoriously inefficient and wasteful (it has been estimated that 
in Shanxi over half of irrigation water is lost before it reaches crops due to the poor 
irrigation infrastructure) (Kim, 2002, 60). Since 2003 the central government has been 
encouraging industrial water users, especially large enterprises, to invest in water saving 
projects for existing irrigation schemes in exchange for the right to use the saved water 
(Yang, 2010). While it is debatable how effectively local governments will implement 
these programs, or if they will achieve enough savings to compensate for the projected 
extra 100 million tons of water withdrawal demand, it nonetheless shows that the 
government is taking seriously the water resource challenges posed by the project. 
For the three smaller plants moving forward, built by Lu‘an, Yitai, and Yankuang, 
it is difficult to identify their water source or whether they are taking measures to 
compensate for withdrawal increases as very little information has been made publicly 
available. More research is needed. 
 
5.7 Efforts to Address Coal to Oil Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
The carbon-intensive nature of coal to oil projects is a challenge both for the 
Chinese government and the companies that are promoting the development of coal to oil. 
A plant that produces 3.5 mta of synthetic oil would (without CCS) produce 
approximately 16 mtpa of CO2, equivalent to a 3 giggawatt coal-fired utility plant (IEA, 
2006, 24). In each of the previously mentioned NDRC announcements regarding coal to 
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oil, C02 emissions have been cited as one of the key contradictions to be overcome if the 
industry is to continue developing. It appears that significant efforts are underway to deal 
with this challenge, and these efforts provide yet more evidence of government‘s 
attempts to compensate for the resource challenges imposed by this industry. 
 Utilization of carbon capture and storage technology is the only way to eliminate 
the carbon emissions associated with coal to oil processes. Shenhua is taking the lead in 
this effort, in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Energy and West Virginia 
University, through development of a large-scale CCS project for its Inner Mongolia 
operation that may eventually capture up to 3 million tons of CO2 annually (of a total 3.4 
million tons produced). The three parties have already completed a pre-feasibility study 
and are now working on a demonstration project to capture and sequester 100,000 tons of 
carbon annually at a cost of US $30.8 million dollars (Xinhua, 2010a). The project is 
expected to expand to capture one million and then three million tons of CO2 annually, 
with an estimated project cost of US $1.4 billion (Morse et al. 2009, 7). Once completed, 
it would be the largest CCS demonstration project in the world.  
For the Sasol-Shenhua-Ningxia project in Ningxia, Sasol announced in 2009 that 
it would incorporate a CCS option in the upfront design of the plant in order to make it 
carbon capture ready (Engineering News, 2009). Although there is no guarantee that the 
plant, if built, will implement CCS technology, the step is significant since it allows for 
the possibility of CCS at a future date with minimal retrofitting costs. Sasol is also 
actively looking for carbon storage locations in the vicinity of the proposed plant. While 
less information is available about the three smaller Chinese coal to oil plants, Yitai 
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announced in 2010 that it would be investing one billion RMB to plant trees around 
Ordos to create a carbon sink, which will not only absorb carbon emissions but also help 
prevent desertification the region (Wang, 2010). Less is known about the Lu‘an and 
Yankuang plants‘ plans for dealing with carbon emissions, but it is possible to conclude 
that there is recognition within the coal to oil industry in China that CO2 emissions and 
how they are dealt with will affect the long-term development of the industry. 
 
5.8 Recognition of Coal to Oil‘s Demand Pressures on Coal Reserves 
 The impact of China‘s coal to oil industry on coal resources is directly correlated 
to the size of the industry, meaning there are no policies or fixes that can alter the 
relationship between synthetic oil produced and coal consumed. Therefore, it is difficult 
to pinpoint specific government policies that directly take into account the inefficient use 
of coal resources by coal to oil projects other than the government‘s overall cautious 
approach to developing the industry and managing its size. Policy statements over the 
past five years make clear that the government takes seriously the risk of allocating too 
much coal to the coal to oil industry; by halting all new projects for at least three years it 
is essentially placing a cap on the amount of coal that will be dedicated to the industry. In 
every statement issued by the government since 2006, the inefficient use of coal 
resources and high energy demands of the industry have been mentioned, and the 
government has also made clear that the future development of the industry will be 




5.9 Central Government Recognition of the Challenges Posed by Coal to Oil‘s Resource 
Demands 
The government‘s approach to the resource and environmental challenges posed 
by coal to oil development in these three specific areas demonstrates clearly that there is 
an awareness of the potentially negative consequences posed by coal to oil development, 
a recognition that coal to oil projects cannot be allowed to develop unchecked, and that it 
is irresponsible for the industry to blindly pursue its own profits and interests at the 
expense of critical resources such as coal and water. In addition to the resource and 
environmental concerns highlighted, there are other issues associated with this industry 
that rightfully give the government pause, such high upfront capital costs, questionable 
economics, and the presently immature status of the coal to oil technologies that China 
attempts to develop on its own.  
At the same time, the government must balance these potentially negative impacts 
with the energy security benefits of developing a domestic coal to oil industry. As the 
International Energy Agency has pointed out, a large-scale coal to oil industry in China 
that produces between thirty and fifty million tons of synthetic oil per year will help 
minimize China‘s reliance on foreign oil imports by boosting domestic ―oil‖ production. 
At current rates of domestic oil production, the production of forty million tons of 
synthetic oil per year would boost China domestic production by over one-third – far 
from a trivial amount. But, as has been shown, the government is not letting this potential 
energy security benefit blind it to the potentially negative impacts associated with a large-
scale coal to oil industry. Rather, the government is actively taking measures to regulate 
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and slow the development of the industry and to mitigate or offset the negative 























Chapter 6: Key Findings and Implications 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 The Chinese government has overseen one of the greatest economic transitions in 
history and has succeeded in lifting China from the status of a third world country in the 
1970s to that of a great power in the world economy and geopolitics. Effective 
governance has been key to this ascent, and as I have followed the development of 
China‘s coal to oil industry I have often been reminded of the comment made to me by a 
European Union trade representative in Beijing, who said ―Say what you will about 
China‘s government, but govern they can. Govern they can.‖ Is it conceivable that China 
would let its coal to oil industry develop unchecked in spite of potentially disastrous 
consequences for its environment, resource base, and social stability? Contrary to the 
premise I began with four years ago, at a time when China‘s environmental problems 
seemed at their worst, my answer now is no. The central government has too much at 
stake to allow the runaway development of one industry to worsen the outlook for two 
resources as critical to future development as water and coal, or to turn a blind eye its 
rapidly growing carbon emissions. 
Researching this industry has provided many insights into China‘s energy 
policymaking style and the challenges facing the government as it attempts to reconcile 
competing domestic demands. China‘s style of energy governance has many flaws, and in 
the end, no matter what policies it chooses, it simply may never be able to simultaneously 
address the challenges of energy security, economic growth, sustainable development, 
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and domestic social harmony. But it can balance those demands as much as possible, and 
it is my conclusion, with a few caveats, that the style with which Beijing has governed 
the development of the coal to oil industry is not only logical, but also quite sensible 
given the number of divergent issues and interests the industry affects. The notion I had 
in 2006 that China would allow the coal to oil industry to develop at a blistering pace 
without regard to the consequences has been to me disproven.  
Of the three research questions this study has sought to answer, most important is the 
question about what the government‘s management of this industry reveals about energy 
sector governance in general. Unsurprisingly, my own conclusions and observations are 
generally in agreement with the findings of previous studies, and they support rather than 
disprove the opinions of informed observers. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, 
the difference between ―perception‖ and ―reality‖ as they relate to China‘s energy 
policymaking process could not be starker. When starting this study, I (like many) 
mistakenly believed that the central government was firmly in control of energy policy, 
that the term ―state owned‖ really did equate to ―state controlled,‖ and that the 
authoritarian structure of the Chinese state really did create strategic purpose and 
coherence in the energy policy making arena. Thus, when I read pronouncements coming 
from China about producing tens of millions of tons of synthetic oil from coal the coming 
years, it seemed natural to conclude that this really was government policy, and that the 
decision had been made.  
Gradually, I‘ve come to a different conclusion. Ambitious statements about the 
industry‘s development almost always originated from sources within the mining and 
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energy companies developing the industry, and the one document that appeared to show 
the government‘s commitment to developing a massive coal to oil industry, the Medium- 
and Long -Term Development Plan for National Coal Chemical Industry, was in fact 
only a draft plan that four years later has yet to be finalized. In short, I have realized that 
many of the earlier observations made about the nature of the energy policymaking 
process in China are generally true. Decentralization is an enormous problem facing the 
institutions governing China‘s energy sector, and one should not assume that policies 
originating at the center are being strictly followed, or that development can only take 
place with central government approval. Powerful energy companies do hold 
considerable sway, and when possible they will use their leverage and profile to promote 
or even influence policy decisions at the center. And, thanks in part to China‘s relatively 
weak energy institutions, the policy process is indeed reactive, ad hoc, incremental, and 
protracted.  
But while the first two of these three challenges (decentralization and powerful 
energy companies) are undoubtedly problematic and impede the government‘s ability to 
create policy or regulate the energy sector, I believe there is a certain logic in the 
―muddling through‖ approach energy institutions sometimes take in setting policy. In the 
case of the coal to oil industry, this protracted, incremental style of policymaking may 
even have been to China‘s and the industry‘s long-term benefit. Before explaining this 
assertion, I will first describe my observations as they relate to the first two challenges, 




6.2 The Challenge of Decentralization 
Decentralization and the challenges it creates as provinces pursue self interest and 
economic gain is an obstacle often identified as impeding the government‘s ability to 
create effective energy policy. The most obvious challenge decentralization creates for 
the central government as it manages the coal to oil industry is the concern that coal to oil 
projects might continue developing beyond the central government‘s control, out of its 
view, and without approval. The multiple warnings in NDRC policy announcements for 
companies or provinces to not ―break up projects into small parts‖ in order to avoid 
government controls indicates that the government does not always have firm control 
over events on the ground, and that the provinces may be directly or indirectly disobeying 
mandates from the center. As one article describes it, companies use a ―decentralized, 
phased implementation approach to turn the small into big, which is not only beneficial to 
passing evaluations, but also allows them to occupy more resources‖ (Pan et al. 2008, 64). 
Other articles point out that project developers announce an eventual total planned 
capacity above the government‘s limits in order to be in compliance even though the 
initial phases of the project are small scale, a strategy designed to circumvent the central 
government‘s 2006 ban on plants with a capacity under 3 million tons per annum.(Coal 
Net, 2007).  
Local governments have a great deal to gain from the development of multi-billion 
dollar coal to oil projects in their provinces, including tax revenue, local development and 
investment, job creation, and legitimacy in the eyes of the public. As was pointed out by 
Wang Zhengwei of Ningxia, when discussing the regional benefits of the proposed 
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Shenhua-Ningxia and Sasol join venture, "If this project is formally completed, the 
investment of 58 billion yuan ($8.50 billion) will stimulate the economy. Once it is 
constructed, it will earn 30 billion yuan a year, and 10 billion yuan in taxes" (Reuters, 
2010). Personal gains for local officials in the form of illegal taxes or bribes are also 
inevitable. Thus, there is every reason to believe that provincial governments favor and 
support coal to oil projects despite the central government‘s trepidation. It is telling that 
even in December 2009, after years of efforts to slow industry developments, the NDRC 
was still citing a figure of over 40 mta of announced projects as it called for more 
measures to slow overcapacity. This is in spite of the fact that almost a year and half 
earlier it had announced that only two projects would be allowed to develop.   
This study cannot definitively prove that provinces have directly disobeyed the orders 
of the central government, nor can it conclusively determine the actual status of all 
known and unknown coal to oil projects under development. Without traveling to the 
main coal producing regions, looking for oneself, and conducting extensive interviews, it 
is impossible to say with certainty how many projects are developing outside of the 
governments view or without its approval. My own conclusion is that the five projects I 
have mentioned are the flagships of the industry, but planning and development may be 
underway for new projects in Xinjiang, Shandong, or Northeast China. But my research 
directly supports the conclusion that decentralization is a significant challenge facing the 
central government as it attempts to plan and regulate China‘s booming energy sector, 
and that it must often rein in the activities of the provinces as they pursue local gain 




6.3 Influential Energy Companies 
The power and influence of large, state-owned energy companies is another factor 
thought to influence energy policy in China, and coal to oil companies have made 
considerable effort to promote their goals in Beijing. Over the past four years Shenhua 
has been the most active supporter of coal to oil and has repeatedly emphasized the 
important energy security gains yielded by the industry while making overly optimistic 
statements about the size and scale of industry development. Shenhua has also been 
joined by industry executives from other coal companies in promoting coal to oil as an 
opportunity for China to develop domestic technologies using Chinese intellectual 
property. With the exception of the proposed Shenhua-Sasol joint venture in Ningxia, the 
remaining four projects are all utilizing (or at least partially utilizing) technologies 
derived from Chinese intellectual property, a fact that companies are quick to highlight 
when arguing in favor of coal to oil. Together, the emphasis placed by Chinese coal to oil 
companies on energy security and domestic intellectual property led to an unexpected 
finding regarding the extent to which companies use national narratives to promote their 
self interest.  
As discussed in chapter two, energy security became a hot topic in the first half of the 
past decade as China‘s import reliance grew and commentators expressed concern over 
the U.S. Navy‘s control over sea lanes of communication, particularly in the Strait of 
Malacca. Coal to oil companies have latched on to that narrative to promote their projects 
as being in the national interest, and have more often than not used the importance of 
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energy security as a way to elevate their projects in spite of concerns about water 
resources, finite coal resources, or carbon emissions. Arguably, in any country few 
arguments are as compelling, or used as frequently to justify a policy that reflects one‘s 
own, as well as the national interest, as ―national security.‖ Chinese companies are 
clearly no different, and this narrative has influenced private sector strategy for 
drumming up government support for the coal to oil industry. 
Perhaps most interesting in this regard is the extent to which coal to oil companies 
seized on one of China‘s newest national narratives, ―indigenous innovation‖ (zizhu 
chuangxin), which promotes domestic innovation and encourages Chinese companies to 
develop their own patents, technologies, and intellectual property. Over the past four 
years the coal to oil companies using Chinese intellectual property have attempted to link 
their projects to this particular narrative in hopes of gaining high-level government 
support (Pan et al. 2008). Confirmation of the efficacy of this narrative is that although 
the  NDRC‘s 2008 announcement that called for the halting of all but two coal to oil 
projects, the projects by Yitai, Lu‘an, and Yankuang were absent from the list. These 
three have continued to develop and achieve measured successes over the past two years, 
including Lu‘an and Yitai‘s successful 2009 test runs of their small-scale indirect coal to 
oil projects that are under development (Xinhua, 2009). While impossible to confirm 
without further research, I would propose that the reason they have been allowed to 
continue developing is because they are using Chinese intellectual property, a critically 
important form of legitimacy in the eyes of the central government.  
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Even the future of the proposed joint venture between Shenhua-Ningxia and Sasol is 
being transformed by the drive to develop and utilize Chinese technology. In early 2010, 
near the time the project was receiving approval for its environmental impact statement, it 
was reported that the Ningxia government and Zhang Guobao, head of China‘s National 
Energy Administration, were calling for the submission of an alternative plan for the 
project that excluded Sasol from the proposed joint-venture in favor of a plan that used 
exclusively homegrown Chinese technologies (Dow Jones, 2010). Part of the reason for 
this may be Sasol‘s unwillingness to transfer intellectual property to China in return for 
building the project, and the extreme caution Sasol has shown in protecting its proprietary 
technology (Creamer, 2008). It has yet to be determined if and how the project will 
proceed, but this example is symbolic of both the emphasis China places on indigenous 
innovation and the ability of Chinese companies to capitalize on that narrative.   
The national narratives of energy security and indigenous innovation have both been 
used successfully before to advance private sector interests. The indigenous innovation 
narrative was used by the developers of China‘s domestically developed 3G 
telecommunications standard (known as TD-SCDMA) to gain government support, 
eventually resulting in the central government‘s requiring China Mobile to adopt this 
particular standard despite its initial reluctance.(Gao, 2009). Similarly, the energy 
security and the ―Malacca dilemma‖ narrative has been used by the Yunnan government 
and Sinopec (one of China‘s three national oil companies and its largest refiner of crude 
oil) to justify building oil and gas pipelines from the Bay of Bengal through Myanmar to 
the capital of Yunnan, Kunming (Kong, 2010). While it is difficult to determine how 
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significant energy security, indigenous innovation, or the national interest was as a part of 
these companies‘ motivations, one should not overlook the fact that in each case the 
companies stood to gain monetarily if their suggested proposals were adopted. 
In the case of the coal to oil industry, the potential for profit is arguably the prime 
mover behind the activities of the companies involved. The profit potential of coal to oil 
and coal to liquids development was described in a 2010 media report about Inner 
Mongolia‘s booming coal chemical industry. According to the article, when mining 
companies use the coal they mine to generate electricity themselves (known as ―coal by 
wire‖), the coal becomes almost eight times as valuable as it would be if they simply 
mined and sold it. But when converted into processed products, like natural gas, DME, 
synthetic oil, or methanol, the coal is up to twenty times as valuable as it would be if sold 
to electricity generators. With this in mind, the provincial government Inner Mongolia 
created a plan to convert up to half of its coal production into value-added coal chemical 
products. And while the size of the potential profits are high, the scale of the investments 
is staggering – in Ordos, Inner Mongolia (one of several coal-rich areas in the province), 
21 projects have been started with a total investment of 73.89 billion RMB (over U.S. 
$900 billion) (Zhang, 2010). While at least two of these are coal to oil projects, the others 
are not and will produce a range of products.  
Profit potential likely obscures or discourages attention to the potential negative 
impacts associated with coal to oil development. For example, Inner Mongolia and 
Ningxia are two of China‘s most arid provinces and both are in close proximity to the 
Yellow River. But rather than aridity and water scarcity acting as obstacles, the provinces 
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are instead seen as ideal locations for coal to oil development. According to Zhang 
Wenjiang, chairman of Shenhua-Ningmei, "Ningxia is not only rich in coal but also in 
water and power supply, which are all important for the successful development of an 
indirect coal-liquefaction project" (Qi, 2006). In reality, Ningxia is one of the most water-
short and arable land-poor regions of China, with per capita annual water resources just 
one half the Chinese national average. These two factors, the general aridity of the 
provinces and their proximity to a river that is already stretched thin in terms of water 
depletion, are viewed as negative attributes by the central government policymakers who 
would be left to contend with the negative consequences associated with greater stress on 
water resources. But for the companies urging coal to development, these challenges are 
arguably viewed from a perspective that prioritizes profitability over concerns about 
social unrest or environmental displacement. 
 A 2010 report from the Pew Center on Global Climate Change summarized the 
profit motive in coal to liquids projects, saying 
These efforts to develop CTL are mainly driven by market forces and governmental 
policies. First, large coal-mining companies have become more interested in liquid 
fuels, other coal chemicals, and electricity businesses, which are more profitable than 
coal-mining alone. There are also a growing number of such companies that have 
gained the capability to enter the coal-chemical business because of a government 
policy that encourages the merger of traditionally small coal mines. Another factor is 
that their efforts are encouraged and supported by the local governments, which can 
expand their tax base and retain more profits from large coal-mining companies after 
the central government transferred their ownership to them in the 2000s. High oil 
prices worldwide in recent years also played a significant role. (Sun, 2010) 
 
 It is unsurprising that China‘s Shenhua Group has taken the lead in coal to oil and 
has been able to move ahead with two large projects. Shenhua is the largest key state-
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owned coal company in China and produces ten percent of China‘s coal output. Shenhua 
started coal production in 1995 under direct control of the State Council, and remains a 
vertically integrated firm that coordinates with four ministries and six provincial 
governments (Peng, 2009). Shenhua is a powerful, highly-connected company that has 
direct access to China‘s leading officials. Shenhua may yet reach its ambitious goals for 
synthetic oil production, but given the uncertainty in Beijing over the future of the coal to 
oil industry, the opportunity to move ahead with two projects with a total investment of 
over US 10 billion shows it has considerable support in at least some branches of the 
government. Likewise, the Yitai Group is considered China‘s most successful private 
coal mining enterprise, and ―With strong support from the Inner Mongolia government, 
Yitai is able to expand its business to dedicated short distance coal railways, coal 
chemicals including CTL pilot plant and pharmaceutical business‖ (Tu, 2010). China‘s 
Lu‘an Group and Yankuang Group are also powerful players. Given that each of these 
companies is a champion of provincial level governments, it is likely that they bring 
considerable economic and political clout to their negotiations with the NDRC and NEA 
over which projects will proceed and the types of targets and policies to be established 
for the industry.  
 I believe this study supports the conclusion that private companies have made 
efforts to influence the debate about coal to oil in China. Though it is difficult to quantify 
the effectiveness of those efforts, this study supports the general consensus that energy 
companies are important actors in the policy process, that they actively seek to shape 
policy, and that they can be counted on to pursue their own interests even if those 
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interests are potentially in conflict with larger national interests. In this respect, there is 
an interesting parallel with the drive to develop a coal to oil industry that took place in 
the United States in the first half of the last decade (2000-05. As in China, coal-rich states 
and energy companies lobbied aggressively for national support of coal to oil 
development and featured the narratives of energy security and energy independence 
prominently in their arguments. These lobbying efforts were fiercely resists by 
environmental groups and others who questioned the degree to which coal to oil could 
enhance America‘s energy security and whether the incremental reductions in energy-
import reliance were worth the considerable costs, both financial and environmental. In 
the end, those opposed to coal to oil development in the U.S. prevailed, preventing the 
federal government from enacting policies or legislation that would jumpstart the 
industry in the U.S. 
In China, where there is no formal system of lobbying that affects policy, efforts 
from industry or environmental groups to influence coal to oil policy have taken different, 
less visible, and less direct forms. Nonetheless, given China‘s recent attempts to halt or 
slow coal to oil development, it is noteworthy that the results produced by two political 
systems different in structure and process appear to be at similar places in the ongoing 
debate regarding coal to oil development. This is a topic that is worthy of future research 






6.4 China‘s Energy Policymaking Process 
One of the findings of this study is that important decisions related to the coal to oil 
industry in China have essentially been forced onto the central government by the 
activities of the private sector. Driven by China‘s recent and intense interest in energy 
security, its growing demand for oil, and rising energy costs, powerful mining and energy 
companies, both domestic and international, have taken advantage of a window of 
opportunity for development of coal to oil projects and have done so in a compressed 
period of time between 2002 and 2009. At the same time, by giving Shenhua its blessing 
to develop the world‘s largest direct coal to oil project and encouraging investment in so-
called clean coal technologies, China‘s government seemed to have signaled to 
companies that the time was right for large-scale investment in coal to oil projects – 
projects that would not only enhance China‘s energy security, but would also go hand in 
hand with profit motives. As mentioned above, the lack of political support for coal to oil 
in the U.S. has largely prevented the industry from developing. But in China, it has taken 
an act of political will simply to slow the industry‘s development . Many of the economic 
and political barriers to coal to oil development present in the US are absent or less 
constraining in China, leading companies to announce projects and in some cases begin 
them without Beijing‘s complete support or approval (although many of the projects 
probably had local government approval). The government has had little choice but to 
react to new developments on the ground, and make ad hoc decisions about how to do so. 
The ad hoc policy decisions made over the past four years have been incremental, 
ranging from: (1) the original 2006 announcement that only projects above a certain size 
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would be allowed to proceed, (2) to the call to halt all but two projects, (3) to the recent 
announcement that no new projects would be built for at least three years. The 
government has not acted as the lead voice on the issue, nor has it tried to clearly define 
what the industry will look like in five, ten or fifteen years.  
This study also supports the conclusion that China‘s energy policymaking process is 
protracted and that most policies are shaped over longer periods of time. For the reasons 
discussed above as well as other domestic challenges, such as conflicts among 
bureaucracies, local governments, and powerful energy companies, it has been difficult 
for the Chinese government to make concrete decisions about the future of this industry. 
While I believe there are certain benefits to this slow style of policymaking, there is also 
reason to believe that outside of the directives that have been discussed, the government 
has struggled in its attempt to craft long-term policies and plans for the industry. 
Evidence of this can be found in the extremely slow progress of the government in 
drafting the Medium- and Long-Term Plan for Development of the Coal Chemical 
Industry, originally released in draft form in 2006. More than four years later, the plan 
has yet to be finalized despite numerous meetings, hearings, and indications that it was 
nearing completion. In 2006, 2007, and again in 2008, the NDRC announced that its 
consultations on the draft plan had in principle been completed and that it would aim to 
release the draft by ‗year‘s end.‘ The same was said in 2009. At that time, commentators 
attributed the reasons for the delay to the ―discrepancy of comments from different 
interest groups‖ (China Chemical Report, 2009).  
109 
 
Thus, while the complexity of the issue and large number of variables involved has 
slowed decision making, it is also likely that there have been protracted negotiation 
between stakeholders. From this perspective, it is possible that by choosing to allow five 
coal to oil projects to proceed, the government sought to strike bargains between those in 
favor of development and those opposed to it. All of the coal companies moving ahead 
with coal to oil projects in China are among the largest in the country, and the projects 
are distributed among the four largest coal producing provinces in China, an indication 
that certain companies and provinces are being treated favorably as a way to placate key 
mining interests. This is a subject worthy of further study. 
It is also likely the large number of government bureaucracies that influence the 
formulation of energy policy have differing views on whether or not coal to oil should be 
developed, magnifying the problems created by the absence of a dominant energy policy-
making institution in China. When China announced the creation of a National Energy 
Commission to formulate a national energy strategy in January 2010, twenty 
bureaucracies were given a seat at the table, including a range of stakeholders such as the 
Ministry of Science and Technology, the State Administration of Taxation, the Ministry 
of Water Resources, and the Ministry of Environmental Protection. While all of these 
ministries have a role to play in helping the country create a coherent energy strategy, 
differences of opinion are inevitable as each jockeys for power and status within the 
government. In the end, it is the National Energy Administration and the National 
Development and Reform Commission that exert the most influence over energy policy 
in China; balancing the needs and interests of so many bureaucracies can only complicate 
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an already daunting mandate. The number of conflicting statements about coal to oil I 
have outlined supports previous observations that the relatively weak institutions 
governing the energy sector make policymaking more difficult and that bargaining is 
likely part of the policymaking process.  
 Interestingly, in spite of obvious flaws and challenges to energy policymaking and 
resource management in China, I believe that the government‘s style of reactionary, ad 
hoc policymaking, at least in the case of the coal to oil industry, is both rational and 
sensible. In fact, I believe it is a perfectly logical response to the situation China faces in 
relation to this industry; that is, by muddling through for a period with pronouncements 
about what not to do, rather than directives about what to do, Beijing is providing itself 
with valuable decision making time and space in order to observe the evolution of a 
number of critical variables that will inform its decisions on the future of coal to oil. As 
discussed below, because so many variables must be included in the decision making 
process of energy policymakers in Beijing as they weigh the advantages and 
disadvantages of large-scale coal to oil development, this approach may in the end allow 
Beijing to formulate more effective, coherent policies for the industry.  
The list of variables is that will influence the fate of the coal to oil industry is long 
and complicated, includes both domestic and international factors, and contains a large 
number of unknowns. The energy efficiency, water consumption, and overall resource 
needs of the projects have been presented but cannot be precisely known without more 
demonstrations and pilot projects. The economic viability and profitability of the industry 
is uncertain and depends on range of domestic and international factors. The technologies 
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themselves, with the exception of Sasol‘s indirect coal to oil technology, have yet to be 
proven on a large scale and will need time to be perfected. A downstream distribution 
infrastructure will be needed in order to monetize the liquefied products. China‘s energy 
outlook is changing as new technologies like wind, solar, and nuclear energy are 
implemented widely, and changes in the transportation sector, such as the evolution of 
natural gas or electricity powered vehicles, may change the landscape further. The world 
has yet to agree on a climate change regime, which may include a carbon tax that 
penalizes carbon intensive fuels such as coal while incentivizing the use of cleaner forms 
of energy. The price of oil has shown extreme volatility in the past four years, with a 
fierce debate underway about whether or not global oil supplies are on the verge of 
reaching peaking. Last but not least, the global geostrategic environment and the future of 
US-China relations, looking forward over the next decade, is uncertain.   
The combination of these issues and how they unfold in the coming years will 
determine the utility and viability of coal to oil technologies, But at the moment too little 
is known for China to be able to craft a long-term coal to oil development plan that 
accounts for each possible outcome or combination of outcomes. From this perspective, 
developing a handful of projects that use different technologies while taking a wait and 
see approach is not only rational, it makes more sense than rushing into a decision that, as 
I have shown, will have significant implications for China‘s environment.  
In the coming years, when more is known about the complex issues involved, a more 
―coherent‖ policy for coal to oil can be established. In the meantime, China can still 
develop the capacity to develop a coal to oil industry without taking it to scale, thereby 
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preparing the industry to rapidly expand future production as conditions warrant. In 
Chinese language articles, this thinking is characterized by the use of the term 
―technology reserve‖ (jishu ku or jishu chubei), a term that I believe captures the 
government‘s current way of thinking about coal to oil. As Zhou Dadi put it, "All 
countries have taken coal liquefaction as a technology reserve. I'm not against having 
such technology and developing it to a certain scale." If China is not sure to what extent it 
may need to rely on coal to oil technologies in the future, it makes sense to develop the 
industry on a limited scale today, thereby minimizing risks and potentially negative 
impacts while gaining a new and potentially valuable capability.  
 
6.5 Conclusions 
China‘s emerging coal to oil industry provides an excellent example of both the 
complexity of the energy policymaking environment in China and the difficult choices 
and tradeoffs that policymakers must make as they pursue divergent or even conflicting 
goals. In this study, there are two primary sources of tension that policymakers must 
contend with. The first is between those who would push for large-scale coal to oil 
development and those who oppose it, while the second tension is between the pros and 
cons of large scale development. Within the first tension, the actors involved include 
energy and mining companies, provincial and local officials and stakeholders, various 
bureaucracies within the government, the military, and, to a lesser degree, those who 
would potentially suffer as a result of development, such as rural farmers. Within the 
second tension, issues to be factored into the equation when determining the utility and 
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ultimate value of coal to oil development include energy security, economic development 
and profit potential, coal resource impacts, water resource impacts, environmental 
implications (i.e. carbon emissions), the viability of the region‘s agricultural activities 
(which touches on issues of food security), and the opportunity to develop advanced 
energy technologies and Chinese intellectual property.  
 In the end, it is up to those in charge of establishing and enforcing China‘s energy 
policies and managing the energy sector who must not only take into account the costs 
and benefits of coal to oil development, but also contend with the various industry, 
provincial, and institutional actors who have their own vested interest in seeing the 
industry develop in a certain direction. At the same time, the equation for valuing the 
different factors involved, such as energy security or water resources, will continue 
changing as China‘s domestic and international circumstances involve. Just as a sudden 
oil shock or escalation in tensions between the U.S. and China could push China to add 
increasing value to energy security, and by extension the coal to oil industry, so could an 
extended drought that leads to social unrest in north China lead to coal to oil development 
falling out of favor.  
Ultimately, this is why China‘s lack of a strong, well-staffed energy institution, 
such as a Ministry of Energy, is a glaring weakness in the country‘s energy policymaking 
apparatus, and is arguably why Chinese policymakers have been left to take a reactive, ad 
hoc approach to managing the industry‘s development. Given the high stakes involved, in 
terms of development costs, resource impacts, and environmental implications, it is 
essential that decisions about the future of this industry be made on the industry‘s merits 
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alone, not on the interests or influence of the stakeholders involved. As discussed, I 
believe the government is currently managing tensions and balancing competing interests 
relatively well given the circumstances. But in the future, managing these tensions will 
likely grow harder, not easier, and will test the central government‘s ability to formulate 
and enforce energy policies.  
This study makes three main contributions. First, it provides a detailed overview 
of the evolution of China‘s coal to oil industry, describes in depth the specific resource 
and environmental issues that would be affected by the industry‘s development, and 
provides examples of how those issues are being accounted for to varying degrees. 
Second, this study provides a framework for understanding why China‘s coal to oil 
industry has evolved the way it has, and makes sense of the confusing, often 
contradictory nature of project announcements and policy statements emanating from 
China in relation to this industry. Third, this study supports the conclusions of those who 
argue that China‘s energy policymaking process is not necessarily top-down, 
authoritarian in conduct, or even coherent, but rather that the process is complicated, 
messy, and ridden with bargains, compromises, and competition among stakeholders.  
  
6.6 The Future of Coal to Oil in China 
It is difficult to predict whether or not China will develop the capacity to produce 
30 or 40 million tons per year of synthetic oil, or whether it will be able to replace close 
to ten percent of its oil imports with domestic liquefied coal. As described above, 
numerous factors that are as yet unclear will determine the fate of the industry and 
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whether or not the central government is willing to shoulder the considerable 
environmental and resource burdens associated with the industry. In Appendix A, I 
outline three possible development scenarios for China‘s coal to oil industry, offer my 
view on which scenario is most likely, and discuss in depth some of the factors that will 
influence the industry‘s development.s 
 
6.7 Implications of Coal to Oil in China and Beyond 
The prospect that China develops its coal to oil industry slowly and deliberately, and 
that it mitigates the negative externalities associated with the industry by using CCS and 
implementing more efficient irrigation practices, leads to modest negative consequences 
for development of the energy sector on Chinese society as a whole. In addition to energy 
security gains, by attracting billions of dollars of investment in China‘s underdeveloped 
interior provinces, coal to oil projects can help stimulate economic growth and potentially 
provide opportunities for those relying on subsistence farming to join China‘s modern 
economy. For example, it is estimated Ningdong coal chemical base in Ningxia will 
create 30,000 jobs and will increase local incomes by 18 billion RMB per annum by 2020 
(Sexton and Li, 2008). Developing Chinese technologies that could one day be exported 
could also benefit China‘s economy, and simply by taking on challenging projects like 
Shenhua‘s direct coal to oil project China builds engineering and technical capacity, 




For the rest of the world, two of the potential positives emanating from China‘s coal 
to oil activities are the important technological insights gained from the Shenhua CCS 
program and coal to oil‘s capacity to enlarge the global energy pie. China and the world 
will reap significant benefits from the knowledge and learning gained through Shenhua‘s 
efforts to develop CCS capabilities associated with the Inner Mongolia project. The CCS 
project under development will be the largest in the world and currently there are few 
other projects of comparable scale underway as problems related to cost, liability, and 
risk exposure discourage developed countries from being first movers in developing CCS. 
With the knowledge gained from the Inner Mongolia CCS project, China could become a 
world leader in CCS technology while also providing other countries with important 
know how, such as how large volumes of compressed carbon dioxide react when stored 
in different geological formations. Given that the world remains heavily reliant on coal, 
that CCS is the only conceivable method for mitigating the carbon emissions associated 
with coal use, and the imperative to reduce global carbon emissions, advances and 
knowledge about CCS gained through Shenhua‘s activities are extremely valuable.  
Similarly, if China were to eventually produce one million bpd of synthetic oil from 
coal (50 mta), this would be equivalent to boosting global oil production over one percent 
(current global oil production is approximately 85 mbd). While not a dramatic increase, 
by augmenting domestic oil production China‘s demand for oil from international 
markets would decrease pressure on global supply pressures.  
Potential benefits aside, there are many reasons to be doubtful, and even pessimistic, 
that coal to oil will be a net benefit for China, and in my opinion the potentially negative 
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consequences of developing a large scale coal to oil industry outweigh the potential 
benefits. The CCS technologies China intends to use to mitigate coal to oil‘s carbon 
emissions are far from proven, are prohibitively costly, and likely won‘t be applied on a 
scale large enough to fully offset the emissions released in the coal conversion process, 
especially if the industry is taken to scale. Likewise, it is highly questionable and 
probably unlikely that the promised advanced irrigation technologies will materialize and 
offset as much water as intended, or that those who rely on water for irrigation (and are 
already marginalized) in China will be treated fairly, or adequately compensated, for the 
irrigation water lost to coal to oil development. And by putting enormous pressure on 
China‘s coal resources, coal to oil development runs the risk of prematurely depleting 
China‘s domestic reserves and leading to either energy shortages or increased coal 
imports from countries such as Indonesia and Australia.  
In short, the coal to oil industry, if brought to scale, has the potential to create social 
unrest by depriving rural farmers of water, and to worsen the living conditions and 
poverty levels of those on the margins of large projects. The outlook for China‘s water 
resources, especially in the densely populated north and north China plain, is already dire. 
Developing an industry that will increase water consumption by 100, 200, or even 500 
million tons per year in China‘s most water-challenged region is a dangerous proposition. 
Were China to experience massive water shortages in the North China Plain or other 
areas on the banks of the Yellow River, the negative economic impact of unrest and 
migration, and potentially massive increases in grain and food imports, would be felt 
beyond China‘s borders. For these reasons and others, China would be wise to proceed 
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slowly and cautiously as it experiments with coal to oil technologies; ultimately it may 
have to face the prospect of abandoning the effort completely or keeping production 
levels small.  
Still, it is worth reiterating that coal to oil only makes up a small portion of China‘s 
larger coal to liquids industry, and that other areas of the coal to liquids industry are far 
more developed and growing more rapidly. As described, all of these coal chemical 
process are very similar in terms of greenhouse gas emissions, water consumption, and 
coal consumption. While I am in one sense heartened by China‘s restraint in developing 
coal to oil, I am aware that China‘s coal to liquids industry may already have an 
environmental and resource impact that is cumulatively as great as a large-scale coal to 
oil industry. It is beyond the scope of this study to draw definitive conclusions about the 
resource and environmental impact of China‘s larger coal to liquids industry, or its 
importance and contribution to China‘s energy security, but the rapid development of the 
coal to liquids industry should be a source of great interest and concern for those 
researching China‘s sustainable development. If this study serves one larger purpose, it is 
to encourage other researchers to broaden the scope of this research project on China‘s 
coal to oil industry to include coal to liquids in general.  
Finally, as touched on previously, China‘s coal to oil industry is not without strategic 
implication. The history of coal to oil is one based on and founded in war. Militaries are 
traditionally large consumers of petroleum, and domestic oil production is prized as a 
means to fuel trucks, tanks, and jets in the event of conflict or the disruption of oil 
imports. One of coal to oil‘s unique capabilities is that it can be upgrade rather easily to 
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jet fuel, a valuable commodity often in short supply in times of war. Germany 
successfully met a high percentage of its jet fuel needs with coal during WWII, and in 
recent years the United States has successfully flown a variety of Naval and Air Force 
jets on fuel derived from coal (Guardian, 2009). China has been working to develop the 
capability to make fighter jet-ready fuel out of coal, and it has recently had several 
breakthroughs in this respect (Science and Technology Daily, 2009). While not 
necessarily a threat, this is a noteworthy military capability with potential implications 
for the U.S.  
 
6.8 Final Thoughts 
The title of this study poses a question: which phrase best describes the development 
of China‘s coal to oil industry, ―crossing the river by feeling the stones‖ or ―scientific 
development?‖ Before answering this question, it is helpful to provide background on the 
two phrases and their meanings in the Chinese context. The term ―crossing the river by 
feeling the stones‖ (mozhe shitou guo he) is a Chinese proverb that means to ―explore 
one‘s way carefully.‖ It was used by Deng Xiaoping in the 1970s to describe China‘s 
approach to economic liberalization through implementation of partial reforms in a 
gradual, experimental manner, with proven successes expanded on. The term ―scientific 
development‖ (kexue fazhanguan) refers to the current official guiding socio-economic 
philosophy of the Communist Party of China, which was ratified into the CPC's 
constitution in October 2007 under the leadership of President Hu Jintao. The concept 
stresses improving the socialist market economy and incorporating science and 
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technology into China‘s future development, but it also emphasizes a shift away from 
economic growth at all costs to a development model that better incorporates balanced 
development between rural and urban areas, social welfare, and environmental protection, 
with the end goal of creating a harmonious society. 
Although I have the framed the question as an either-or proposition, I believe the 
Chinese government‘s approach to coal to oil management incorporates the meaning of 
both phrases. The government has taken a gradual, experimental approach to coal to oil 
development and is preparing to expand on successes while minimizing the risks of 
failure. In trying out different technologies to gauge their relative merits and 
shortcomings, it can be argued the government is using an approach similar to the one it 
relied on to gradually open China‘s economy to market forces through the use of Special 
Economic Zones and localized policy experiments. This is precisely the approach that 
Deng described as ―crossing the river by feeling the stones.‖  
At the same time, China recognizes that there are adverse consequences to developing 
coal to oil projects, namely greenhouse gas emissions and a large demand for water in 
arid environments. Such thinking reflects growing awareness by the central government 
of sustainable development and ―social harmony.‖ I suspect that in the 1990s, had China 
been facing today‘s predicament of growing oil import dependence and skyrocketing 
energy costs, it would not have hesitated to rapidly develop a large-scale coal to oil 
industry, regardless of the potential environmental and social consequences. Today, 
however, China is more concerned about the environmental and human security costs of 
development than at any time since the founding of the People‘s Republic of China, and I 
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believe this theory of ―scientific development‖ is reflected in the government‘s reluctance 
to offer unqualified support for coal to oil development, at least without knowing more 
about its impacts and whether the balance sheet adds up.  
This thesis has tried to shed light on the challenges and decisions facing China‘s 
leadership and energy bureaucracies as they attempt to govern China‘s emerging coal to 
oil industry. China‘s population, resource geography, rapid economic growth, and social 
inequities combine to create what must at times seem to energy policymakers like an 
intractable set of problems. As it works to create effective energy policies that balance 
and address these competing needs and demands, China‘s leadership confronts problems 
related to economic and political decentralization, powerful energy companies, and weak 
energy institutions. China‘s coal to oil industry embodies and brings together many of 
these challenges and provides a new opportunity for evaluating and observing how 
China‘s energy policies, and the policymakers responsible for them, attempt to face the 
country‘s future. Observers are correct to point out the weaknesses and shortcomings of 
China‘s energy policies and the governing environment in which they are made. But they 
would be wrong to overlook the successes those same policies and institutions have had 
in spite of the array of problems they face.  
It is too early to render a final verdict on China‘s management of the coal to oil 
industry. In the future, policymakers may be overwhelmed by the drive for profit and the 
pursuit of energy security, giving in to massive coal to oil development whatever the 
costs. But for now, the officials in charge of overseeing China‘s energy sector, and the 
officials overseeing them, seem to recognize that energy security is no substitute for 
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environmental security, or human security, and they are choosing their steps carefully. If 
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China‘s coal to oil industry will likely follow one of three scenarios between now 
and the year 2020. In the first scenario, the government does not actively support or 
promote coal to oil development; the Shenhua-Sasol project in Ningxia is never actually 
constructed (or a much smaller version of the planned project is built); the three smaller 
domestic projects develop to or slightly beyond the demonstration phase but never exceed 
one million tons per year; and Shenhua‘s direct coal to oil project in Inner Mongolia 
achieves operational success but does not expand beyond the first phase of development. 
In this scenario, China‘s coal to oil industry would produce between five and ten million 
tons of synthetic oil per year, making it boutique technology that generates some revenue 
and fuels some automobiles and airplanes, but is not a major contributor to China‘s 
domestic oil production or energy security.  
In the second scenario, the five projects under planning or construction today 
reach their planned capacity or close to it, other projects are developed in places like 
Xinjiang or southwest China, and the total annual production reaches approximately 30 
million tons of synthetic oil per year (or approximately 600k barrels of oil per day) in 
2020. If China is consuming approximately 550 million tons of oil per year (or 11.2 
million barrels per day) in 2020, as the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences projects 
(Reuters, 2008), this would mean the coal to oil industry is meeting approximately five 
percent of China‘s total demand and replacing approximately 8 percent of China‘s total 
imports. Clearly, this is not an insignificant amount, and if coupled with other oil 
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replacement strategies, such as the use of biofuels and methanol derived from coal, China 
could potentially reduce its oil imports by 10 to 20 percent or more.  
In a third scenario, China aggressively pursues coal to oil and eventually receives 
30 million tons of production per year from Shenhua alone, with other companies like 
Lu‘an and Yitai contributing between 20 to 30 million tons per annum. In this scenario, 
which was predicted by the US Department of Energy‘s Energy Information Agency, 
China would be producing approximately 50 million tons per year of synthetic oil by 
2025 and possibly more than 60 million tons per year by 2030 (these volumes are highly 
unlikely by 2020 given the construction and development times of large projects). Were 
the industry to reach 60 million tons (approximately 1.2 million barrels per day) per year 
in 2030, synthetic oil would boost China‘s domestic production by over 40 percent 
(assuming China is producing 2.7 mbd in 2030). While under no scenario is China able to 
eliminate its dependence on oil imports, under the second and third scenario it would be 
able to significantly boost domestic production and enhance its energy security through 
the use of coal to oil technologies.  
Given the number of economic, environmental, and resource challenges created 
by a coal to oil industry that produces 30 or 60 million tons of synthetic oil per year, my 
estimate is that China in the year 2020 will be somewhere in the middle of scenarios one 
and two. While the externalities associated with the coal to oil industry are large enough 
to dissuade China from fully pursuing scenario two or three, several factors will combine 
to propel China past the projections for scenario one. First is the already large 
investments made in developing the coal to oil technologies and in building Shenhua‘s 
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direct coal to oil plant in Inner Mongolia which, if it expands to phase two, will produce 
5 mta on its own. If the Sasol project goes ahead it will add an additional 3 mta. Thus, the 
three smaller projects under development would only need to produce an additional 7 mta 
between them for China to reach 15 mta, or about 300k bpd. In December 2009, the 
NDRC estimated the capacity of announced projects as 40 mta, and as I‘ve mentioned 
before it is difficult to know whether these projects are on the drawing board, undergoing 
feasibility studies, or under construction. Though I suspect most of them are only plans 
and studies at the moment, and the government has halted new projects for at least three 
years, should these projects proceed the industry‘s output could easily reach 20 mta by 
2020.  
Second, these companies and the coal industry as a whole have considerable 
influence in Beijing given their size, profitability, the large number of people they 
employ, and the importance of coal to China‘s economic development. They will likely 
lobby for allowing their projects to expand, especially if there is potential for large profits. 
Third, even if the volume of synthetic oil produced from coal does not significantly offset 
oil imports, there is important strategic value in boosting domestic production. China‘s 
domestic oil production is expected to fall from approximately 3.7 mpd in 2006 to 2.7 
mbd in 2030, and domestic oil production is extremely important to modern militaries 
who must be prepared, in a time of crisis, to meet their gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel needs 
without relying on oil imports, which may not be available. A coal to oil industry, even a 
relatively small one at 15 mta, would provide important reserve production capacity 
should oil imports suddenly slow or stop.   
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There are, however, circumstances that may push China into pursuing a much 
more aggressive approach to developing the coal to oil industry.  One would be a 
prolonged period of tight world oil supply that drives prices to unprecedented heights,  
immediately driving up the profitability of the coal to oil projects. The incentive would 
increase if these projects are actually able to produce gasoline or diesel at less than the 
equivalent of U.S. $60-70 per barrel. As mentioned, between 2000 and 2008 global oil 
prices rose from $23 to $145 per barrel. If in the future global oil production begins to 
decline and new reserves are not brought on line quickly enough to keep pace with 
growing demand (a scenario that many predict is not far away), it is conceivable global 
oil prices will return to or even surpass the $150 per barrel level and stay there 
indefinitely. The impact such a scenario would have on China‘s economy is enormous 
and would drive China to considerably ramp up coal to oil investment and production in 
response.  
A second possibility is that China suddenly cannot buy oil on the free market, at 
any price, and is therefore unable to meet domestic demand. The resulting economic and 
political implications terrify the CCP since the economic shocks of such a scenario would 
likely lead to political unrest or worse. However unlikely it appears now, the threat or 
implementation of economic sanctions or a U.S.-led oil embargo that cut off (or 
significantly decreased) China‘s oil imports would almost certainly drive China to 
increase coal to oil production as quickly as possible. I believe the threat of such a 
possibility is one reason China is developing a coal to oil ―technology reserve,‖ a fact 
alluded to in a publication where two of China‘s leading scholars on the coal to industry 
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stated that ―Other than if China is subject a trade embargo because of political or 
economic reasons, coal to oil is not suitable for large scale development‖ (Sun and Xi, 
2009, 8).  
While one cannot predict the future, I believe both of these worst-case scenarios 
are unlikely to unfold in the near future, which is why I believe coal to oil will develop 
more slowly than experts were predicting in 2007 or 2008; such thinking is the 
background to anticipating that in the year 2020 China will only be producing somewhere 
between 10 and 15 mta. Irrespective of whether China is producing 10 mta or 30 mta in 
2020, China‘s pursuit of a coal to oil industry has implications for China, the U.S. and the 
world, for better and worse.   
 
